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JUDGING SEX
Deborah Tuerkheimer
This Article explores the curious jurisprudence of sexual patterns and
how it constructs female sexuality. In modern rape law, the "unchaste char-
acter inference" expressly prohibited by the rape shield endures. Though the
boundaries that circumscribe appropriate sexual conduct have shfted over
time, courts persist in making normative judgments about women's sexual-
ity. Cloaked in the legitimizing rhetoric of sexual patterns, retrograde no-
tions of deviancy are substituting for rational deliberation on the question of
consent. As rape shield law enters its fourth decade, it continues to defy
reason, both in application and in theory. The proposed evidentiary ap-
proach promises to improve judicial decision making in rape cases, while
reorienting the law toward the female sexual subject and the contingency of
her consent.
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INTRODUCTION
Over three decades ago, rape law advanced to reflect the general
proposition that a woman's past sexual conduct is not evidence that
she consented to an alleged rape.' In the past, behavior deemed un-
chaste was thought to suggest a greater likelihood that a rape victim
willingly engaged in sex with the defendant. 2 The enactment of rape
shield laws-which generally prohibit the introduction of evidence of
a woman's prior sexual history at trial-seemed to represent an em-
phatic rejection of this logic. 3 And yet, the rule of exclusion was never
absolute. In consent-defense cases, a little-noticed exception allows a
court to admit in evidence a woman's sexual history if it is viewed as
"patterned."4 At the time rape shield law was enacted, this exception
ensured that the rule of exclusion would only go so far: too much sex,
or sex of the wrong kind, lay outside of its scope. Archaic though it
may seem, this function endures. The pattern exception permits the
otherwise forbidden inference that past consent to intercourse makes
consent on a separate occasion more likely. If certain conditions ex-
ist, the protection of the rape shield dissipates.
At one time, this exception was a small problem for rape shield
law. Cases involving perceived patterns (such as notable sexual histo-
ries) were, not coincidentally, cases that prosecutors were unlikely to
pursue. 5 So the exception could rest on the ipse dixit logic that "unu-
sual" sexual behaviors were probative, and notions of deviancy silently
1 See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 32-39 (1977) (noting the development of varying rape shield laws in
different U.S. jurisdictions beginning in the mid-1970s).
2 This is commonly referred to as the unchaste character inference. See infta note
235 and accompanying text (noting the inference's "invidious" nature).
3 Harriet Galvin has described the impetus for the rape shield law as follows:
Pressure for evidentiary reform came from an unusual and uneasy alliance
of feminist organizations and law enforcement agencies. These groups per-
suaded legislators that in-court disclosure of the most intimate details of the
rape complainant's personal life acted as a significant deterrent to the re-
porting and, hence, the prosecution of rape. They further maintained that
such "character assassination" in open court, a common defense strategy in
forcible rape prosecutions, accounted for the high rate of acquittal in those
cases that proceeded to trial. Most important, a growing body of feminist
literature questioned the traditional rationale that a woman's unchastity
has probative value on the question of whether or not she was raped.
Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 767 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
4 See infta Part III.
5 Dorothy Roberts has cogently observed:
Although rape statutes and cases articulate the tests of force and noncon-
sent, their meaning has always depended on the identity of the victim and
the accused. Courts often appear to be asking the question, "How much
force should we allow this type of man to use against this type of woman?"
Very little force, if any, was required to convict a Black man of raping a
white woman. No amount of force was enough to convict a man of raping
his wife or a Black woman or a prostitute.
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dictated the judicial categorization of women's sexual conduct. And
all of this could go unremarked.
But today, on close examination, the conceptual incoherence of
rape shield law has become a more pressing problem. As conscious-
ness about what constitutes rape has evolved, women with eyebrow-
raising sexual pasts are still "bad victims,"6 but they are also more
likely to have their cases reach court.7 Their sexual histories now beg
the question: rule (exclude) or exception (admit)?
Even more important, the new centrality of consent in rape trials
has placed even greater weight on the pattern exception. One can
trace this emergence to two striking developments. First, most sexual
assaults are committed by a man known to the victim,8 and feminist
reform efforts have succeeded in bringing about heightened aware-
ness that acquaintance rape is a crime. 9 Crimes that would not have
been pursued or even reported in the past are prosecuted today.10
Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CH.-KENT L. REv. 359, 363-64
(1993) (footnotes omitted); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1247 (1997) (commenting that contem-
porary "prosecutors want a witness whom jurors will regard as sexually restrained").
6 Consider this prosecutorial perspective on the desirable traits of a rape victim:
A solidly middle-class complainant would not only be more articulate, on
average; she might also be more credible to many jurors than a lower-class
woman, especially in a consent-defense case. After all, prosecutors want a
witness whom jurors will regard as sexually restrained and honest, charac-
teristics that jurors may associate with middle-class status. As an exper-
ienced sex-crimes prosecutor puts it:
Good Victims have jobs (like stockbroker or accountant) or impeccable
status (like a policeman's wife); are well-educated and articulate, and are,
above all, presentable to a jury: attractive-but not too attractive, de-
mure-but not pushovers. They should be upset-but in good taste-
not so upset that they become hysterical.
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 5, at 1247 (quoting ALICE VACHSS, SEX CRIMES 90 (1993)).
In contrast, a "bad victim" comes to the prosecutor's office dressed in "tight blue
jeans. Very tight. With a see-through blouse on top. Very revealing." SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE 9 (1987) (recounting a conversation with a prosecutor about a particular case).
In Susan Estrich's account, this "bad victim" admitted to willingly accompanying her for-
mer lover to watch pornographic videos prior to her rape. The rape was not prosecuted.
7 But see infta note 10 (noting the continuing problem of underenforcement).
8 Nearly one in every five women in the United States is raped in her lifetime. MI-
CHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (2011). Of the women
victimized by rape, half are raped by an intimate partner and forty percent by an acquain-
tance. Id. at 21.
9 See Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625, 626-28
(2005) (arguing that rape law has fundamentally misconceived the crime by employing a
dual requirement of assault and rape, which does not capture the typical "all-American
rape" that an acquaintance commits).
10 This is true despite continuing problems of underenforcement. See MichelleJ. An-
derson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State
Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 929 (2001) (asserting that "[b]y unfounding and
downgrading crimes involving violence against women, police departments neglect to in-
vestigate hundreds, perhaps thousands, of legitimate rape complaints every year"); Bryden
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Unsurprisingly, in an allegation of rape involving acquaintances, con-
sent is almost invariably the defense.
Second, as a practical matter, DNA technology necessitates a con-
sent defense in many cases involving strangers. Before the advent of
DNA typing, these defendants would most often claim misidentifica-
tion. 11 Now, it is far more difficult to do so. Thus, at least where DNA
evidence is available, consent typically becomes the disputed issue.
The surfacing of consent as the pivot point for modern rape prosecu-
tion has placed tremendous pressure on already existing doctrinal
fault lines.
During these same decades, women's sexuality and our sense of
its dimensions have continued to evolve. For instance, according to
the 2010 National Survey of Sexual Health and Behavior, one of the
largest representative studies of human sexuality ever conducted, at
least forty percent of women between the ages of twenty and forty-
nine have engaged in anal sex, and most women between eighteen
& Lengnick, supra note 5, at 1216 (citing studies confirming disparity in prosecutorial
treatment of stranger and acquaintance-rape cases); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prose-
cuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Stran-
gers, Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JusT. Q. 651, 682 (2001) (finding empirical
evidence that in cases involving acquaintances, relatives, or intimate partners "prosecutors'
anticipation of a consent defense and their downstream orientation toward judges and
juries apparently lead them to scrutinize the victim's character and behavior more care-
fully"); see also Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Crimi-
nal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 951, 953-70 (2000) (critiquing the lingering existence of
both the resistance requirement and marital-rape exemptions).
11 The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly account for this misidentification defense,
along with a few delineated others and a constitutional "catchall." In relevant part, Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 reads as follows:
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible.-The following evidence is not ad-
missible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if other-
wise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the al-
leged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the al-
leged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual
misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant.
FED. R. EVID. 412. For a comparison of the federal rape shield to various state-law counter-
parts, see Galvin, supra note 3, at 812-902.
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and forty-nine have engaged in oral sex in the past year. 12 Even com-
pared to research from the early 1990s,13 these proportions have in-
creased-and in the case of anal sex, increased significantly.1 4 Girls
frequently become sexually active as adolescents: in one study, nearly
thirty percent of sixteen-year-old girls reported giving oral sex and
over thirty percent of sixteen-year-old girls reported having vaginal
intercourse.' 5
Though remarkably incomplete, 6 current empirical evidence de-
picts a broad range of female sexual practices 17 that is incompatible
12 See Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Behavior in the United States: Results from a National
Probability Sample of Men and Women Ages 14-94, 7J. SEXUAL MED., Oct. 2010, at 255, 257,
259 (studying a nationally-representative probability sample of 2,936 men and 2,929 wo-
men). The practice of oral sex may itself be gendered, as evidenced by the centrality of
fellatio to "hook up culture." See Paula England et al., Hooking Up and Forming Romantic
Relationships on Today's College Campuses, in THE GENDERED SOCIETY READER 531, 536, 538 &
fig.3 (Michael S. Kimmel & Amy Aronson eds., 3d ed. 2008) ("[W]hen oral sex is not
reciprocal, men are on the receiving end three times as often as women. Even when men
do give women oral sex, they are either unable to or do not make it a priority to bring the
woman to orgasm.").
13 Albert Kinsey's published 1953 research was the "first large-scale systematic study of
female sexual behavior in the United States-and the most comprehensive-although the
sample was admittedly limited." Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Behaviors, Relationships, and
Perceived Health Status Among Adult Women in the United States: Results from a National
Probability Sample, 7J. SEXUAL MED., Oct. 2010, at 277, 277-78. Studies of women's sexuality
have not kept pace given widespread "sociocultural changes ... highly relevant to sexual
behavior" that have taken place since Kinsey's research. Id. at 278.
14 Herbenick et al., supra note 12, at 261.
15 J. Dennis Fortenberry et al., Sexual Behaviors and Condom Use at Last Vaginal Inter-
course: A National Sample of Adolescents Ages 14 to 17 Years, 7 J. SEXUAL MED., Oct. 2010, at
305, 309-10 tbl.2.
16 While the latest research is helpful, what we know about our collective sexual prac-
tices is dwarfed by what we do not. As former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders has noted,
"[w]e have a sexually dysfunctional society because of our limited views of sexuality and
our lack of knowledge and understanding concerning the complexities and joys of human-
ity." M. Joycelyn Elders, Sex for Health and Pleasure Throughout a Lifetime, 7 J. SEXUAL MED.,
Oct. 2010, at 248, 248.
17 Without belaboring the point, recent research also found that, among women be-
tween the ages of 25 and 44, 98% had engaged in vaginal intercourse, 88% in oral sex, and
35% in anal sex. WILLIAM D. MOSHER ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND SELECTED HEALTH MEASURES: MEN AND WOMEN 15-44 YEARS OF AGE,
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 51 tbl.III (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/
ad362.pdf. Among women between the ages of 25 and 44, about one in five had seven to
fourteen sexual partners. Id. at 29 tbl.1 1. Among female teenagers between the ages of 15
and 19 years, over half had engaged in vaginal intercourse, over half in oral sex, and about
ten percent in anal sex. Id. at 51 tbl.III; see sources cited supra note 12 (citing research
suggesting that the practice of oral sex is gendered).
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with traditional understandings' 8 common when rape shield laws were
adopted and in the early stages of implementation. 19
In the intervening years, one might have expected a repudiation
of the notion that a woman's prior sexual conduct can forecast her
sexual consent on a different occasion, or at the very least a critical
and sustained look at the conceptual foundations of this premise.
Neither occurred. Instead, sexual patterns-the term that I will use to
encompass evidence that is variously treated as sexual habit, sexual
propensity, sexual modus operandi, common sexual scheme or plan,
sexual proclivity, and other similar notions of judicial creation 20 -
have become entrenched in our law, while serving as a vehicle for
importing particular views of women and sex.
This Article explores the curious jurisprudence of sexual patterns
and how it constructs female sexuality. Attending to juridical reason-
ing about sex reveals that notions of deviancy are substituting for ra-
tional deliberation on the question of consent. This critique also
shows how an evidentiary exception that allows a victim's history to
prove that she consented to the alleged rape is conceptually at odds
with the rape shield prohibition and its theoretical grounding.21
While there may be reasons to allow defendants to introduce this type
of evidence, these circumstances have not been properly defined by
the extant rape shield law.
Part II describes the evidentiary backdrop against which the sex-
ual pattern exception operates. After demonstrating the inapplicabil-
ity of traditional rationales for prior-acts evidence, this discussion
suggests that judicial ideas about female sexual deviancy are animat-
18 "Under the double standard [of sexuality morality], men were expected to be sexu-
ally active before marriage and on occasion to engage in casual extra-marital sex. Women
were ordinarily denied such freedom and were subjected to harsh social penalties if they
exerted sexual independence." Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 788-89 (1988).
19 Alongside these developments, the notion that female sexual pleasure is properly
the concern of legal theorists has taken hold. See infra note 240 and accompanying text
(noting the rise of prosex feminism).
20 I further elaborate on these concepts below and explain why they are highly sus-
pect. I omit the quotation marks around the terms, including sexual patterns, only for the
sake of readability.
21 Rape shield law's origins reflect the sense that judges and juries overestimated the
probative value of a woman's sexual history, as well as concerns for the collateral conse-
quences of its admission into evidence. See Berger, supra note 1, at 100 (arguing that alter-
ing the treatment of sexual history evidence will help grow "societal respect for women in a
setting where deep and primitive emotions have often beclouded rational analysis"); Gal-
vin, supra note 3, at 795-96 (noting that when states began implementing rape shield laws,
rape was the most underreported serious crime and jurors often misused evidence of vic-
tims' past sexual conduct). This Article focuses on the basic evidentiary grounding of rape
shield law, as opposed to related policy reasons for its rule of exclusion. In other words,
the critique proceeds from principles of relevance and probative value-principles that are
integral to our fact-finding process. See infra note 35 (citing FED. R. EVD. 401 & 403).
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ing the admissibility of sexual patterns. This Part also situates the case
law in both a historical and contemporary context in order to observe
ways in which the discourse has changed and how its basic structure
remains static.
Part III focuses on the modern implementation of the sexual pat-
terns exception. This inquiry reveals that the exception is dependent
on a deeply embedded proposition-namely, that boundaries can be
located around normal female sexuality.22 If this is not a valid pre-
mise, the sexual pattern exception cannot be squared with the rape
shield, and judicial inquiry cannot but fail in its quest to divine cir-
cumstances under which sexual consent on one occasion is probative
of consent on another.
We see these problems in Gagne v. Booker, which was recently de-
cided by the Sixth Circuit en banc. 23 Gagne illustrates the tensions
inherent in judicial efforts to identify sexual patterns in service of
ascribing evidentiary significance to them.2 4 We observe these same
tensions when the strange doctrine of sexual patterns is juxtaposed
against other areas of rape law.25 In these areas, unlike when patterns
are perceived, a woman's choice of sexual partner is afforded duly
privileged status. All of this suggests the need to attend to how judges
draw lines around female sexuality.
Part IV delves into the reasoning-or failure to reason-that
characterizes the jurisprudence of sexual patterns. It focuses on the
categories of female sexual behavior that prove especially troubling
for judges. This analysis uncovers sexual patterns as artifacts of the
traditional view of unchaste women as perpetually consenting. On
this deconstructed account, patterned behavior is none other than
disapproved sex.
Part V asks whether the sexual pattern exception could be ratio-
nalized if unmoored from its moral underpinnings. It offers a taxon-
omy of sexual variability to suggest why a contingent understanding of
consent (i.e., that whether to consent is newly decided on each occa-
sion) is epistemologically sound. Admitting a woman's history to show
her willingness to consent to the alleged rape is inconsistent with this
understanding; the exception must therefore be abandoned.
As an alternative to the framework now in place, this Part pro-
poses an instrumental approach to the admissibility determination-
one that is consistent with both a defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial and a woman's right to sexual autonomy. Regardless of nor-
22 See infra note 47 (explaining concept) and note 237 (discussing generally the legal
construction of normative sexuality).
23 680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012).
24 See id. at 517.
25 See infra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
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mative assessments of its worth, sexual history is not probative of con-
sent.2 6 As the rape shield enters its fourth decade, a reworking is in
order.
I
SEXUAL MODUS OPERANDI?
In a rape prosecution in which the disputed issue is consent,
when, if ever, is the victim's 27 past sexual behavior admissible evi-
dence? If she and the defendant met for the first time at a bar, is it
helpful to know that the victim previously met other men at a bar and
engaged in consensual intercourse? Does it matter if the bar in ques-
tion was always the same? Does the answer change if the victim se-
lected as former sexual partners men of a certain background or
appearance (shared by the defendant)? What if the men had in com-
mon a particular occupation-say, investment banking-or a voca-
tion, such as professional football?28 Or if the woman's sexual
partners were consistently members of the same college fraternity as
that of the defendant? What if the victim had engaged in past consen-
sual acts of anal intercourse or group sex? Is any of this evidence pro-
bative of her willingness to consent to arguably similar conduct with
the defendant-conduct that is allegedly rape?
Rape shield rules generally preclude the admission of a victim's
past sexual history29 unless the evidence satisfies an exception, which
may be either legislatively defined or rooted in a defendant's constitu-
26 I use the term "probative" to refer to a connection between the proffered evidence
(here, past sexual conduct) and the fact on which it purportedly bears (consent on the
occasion in question) that is appreciably closer than what a mere relevance requirement
would necessarily require. Throughout the discussion of sexual history evidence, my focus
will remain on its probative value or worth, as opposed to whether it tends to satisfy the
minimal relevancy standard. See infra note 35.
27 With rare exception, the cases I will discuss involve a finding of guilt at trial. I will
therefore tend to refer to the complainant as a victim, rather than an alleged victim.
28 See infra note 45 and accompanying text (citing Hardy v. State, 285 S.E.2d 547, 549
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981) on victim's "predilection for football players").
29 Unless otherwise noted, my reference to sexual history throughout this Article en-
compasses sexual activities that occurred prior to trial (and almost always prior to the inci-
dent in question) with someone other than the defendant. The discussion is limited to the
admissibility of this type of evidence to show that the victim consented (as opposed to
supporting a defendant's reasonable mistake as to consent), which is consistent with its
most common evidentiary purpose. To be clear, my critique does not encompass cases in
which a victim's prior sexual conduct is admitted to show that the defendant was not a
source of semen or injury. SeeFED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). Nor do I consider situations in
which this type of evidence is admitted to show a motive to falsely allege rape. See, e.g.,
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988) (per curiam) (requiring introduction of evi-
dence that the plaintiff had a motive to lie and falsely allege rape to protect her
relationship).
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tional right to present a meaningful defense.30 One of these excep-
tions I will group under the rubric of sexual pattern evidence. 3'
Jurisdiction dictates whether the specific-legislative exception,32
the judicially created exception,33 or purportedly fact-bound constitu-
tional analysis governs the admissibility of sexual pattern evidence.3 4
Yet regardless of the specific mechanism for determining admissibil-
ity, courts discuss the worth3 5 of this type of evidence in remarkably
similar fashion. When reviewing a trial judge's evidentiary ruling,3 6
appellate courts tend to evaluate the probative value of past sexual
conduct by reference to whether it is sufficiently patterned to mark it
as distinctive.
The evidentiary exception for past sexual conduct said to consti-
tute a pattern can be best understood against the backdrop of inferen-
30 These cases are grounded in the rights of due process, confrontation, and compul-
sory process-collectively, the right to present a meaningful defense. See Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 321 (2006) ("This case presents the question whether a criminal
defendant's federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule ...."); Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 684 (1986) ("The question presented is whether this ruling de-
prived petitioner of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution."); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-303 (1973) (discussing gener-
ally whether the petitioner had a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Berger, supra note 1, at 52-55 (examining the effect on accused's
constitutional rights of the new evidence laws); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and
Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1245, 1247-50 (1989) (discussing the dif-
ferences in rape shield laws).
31 See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
32 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West
2004); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-321 (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-1, R.
412 (West 2011) (discussing relevance of sexual activity); TENN. R. EVID. 412.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 33 M.J. 878, 882 (A.C.M.R. 1991); State v. Gonzalez,
757 P.2d 925, 931-32 (Wash. 1988); Hardy, 285 S.E.2d at 549-51 (cited in Michelle J. An-
derson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield
Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 98 n.247 (2002)).
34 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional rights at
issue and leading cases interpreting them).
35 See FED. R. EvIn. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); FED. R. EvIt. 403
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.").
36 It is worth noting that the case law presents a rather lopsided view of rape shield (as
with most evidentiary) determinations. Written appellate opinions, with only rare excep-
tion, treat a convicted defendant's claims of error. Since trial-court rulings allowing the
cross examination of a rape victim with prior sexual history evidence are not generally the
subject of appeal, a survey of appellate opinions does not fully capture rape shield law in
application. See Anderson, supra note 33, at 95 (discussing the "limited slice of cases [that]
forms the basis for ajurisdiction's jurisprudence on rape shield laws"). Although appellate
opinions addressing sexual history evidence are thus a nonrepresentative sample of trial-
court rulings (i.e., in tending to underrepresent decisions to admit such evidence), they
are still instructive.
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tial reasoning that rape shield laws prohibit. The general rule of
exclusion embodied by these rules responds to (and rejects) a long
sociolegal history of acceptance of the following two propositions: (1)
women who are sexually "promiscuous" are generally more likely to
consent to sex on any given occasion, 37 and (2) women who are sexu-
ally "promiscuous" are generally immoral, making it more likely that
they will testify untruthfully on the subject of nonconsent (and
others) .38
After the enactment of rape shield rules, these rationales were
formally off limits as bases for admissibility. In their place, of neces-
sity, emerged a new explanation for the probative value of sexual his-
tory evidence. Here is the description one state court offered in an
early effort to construe its rape shield law:
Factual similarities between prior consensual sex acts and the
questioned sex acts claimed by the defendant to be consensual
would cause the evidence to meet the minimal relevancy test of [the
applicable evidentiary rule]. For instance, if a complaining witness
frequently engages in sexual intercourse with men shortly after
meeting them in bars, this would have some relevancy if the defen-
dant claims she consented to sexual intercourse with him under
similar circumstances. Such a particularized factual showing would
demonstrate enough similarity between the past consensual activity
and defendant's claim of consent that it would have the necessary
predictive value required by [the applicable evidentiary rule].39
Based on the facts presented, the state supreme court concluded that
evidence of prior sexual conduct on the part of the two victims (raped
at the same time by the defendants) was properly excluded because it
was insufficiently similar to the incident alleged. 40
But the state supreme court hinted at the level of "similarity" that
would lend sufficient probative value to prior history evidence.
41 It
suggested:
[N]o testimony was offered showing that the two women had ever
engaged in sex with men other than sailors whom they knew or that
they had sexual relations with men who had picked them up
hitchhiking. Such evidence would have had greater value in aiding
the jury to predict whether consent was given in this case [which
presented similar facts].42
37 See Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unla-
mented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 90, 98 (1977).
38 SeeJulia Simon-Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered Conceptions of
Honor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854, 1886-93 (2008).
39 State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 520 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
40 Id. at 523.
41 See id. at 520.
42 Id.
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Similar judicial expressions of this admissibility rationale and ex-
amples of its uneven application abound in early rape shield cases. 43
Whether conceptualized as habit,4 4 predilection, 45 or disposition 46 to
engage in specific sex acts, courts analyzed the admissibility of history
evidence by reference to an unmentioned baseline of normative fe-
male sexuality.4 7 Most often, by focusing on the frequency of past in-
cidents and whether they were sufficient in number to constitute a
pattern, courts proceeded as if sexual behavior could be conceived as
the victim's modus operandi.48
At times, this reasoning was made explicit. For instance, one
North Carolina appeals court held that it was reversible error to ex-
clude testimony that "although circumstantial," suggested "that the
prosecuting witness was the initiator, the aggressor, in her sexual en-
counters. '49 The court elaborated as follows:
The evidence excluded suggests that the prosecuting witness's mo-
dus operandi was to accost men at clubs, parties (public places) and
make sexual advances by putting her hands "all over their bodies."
Defendants contend that the prosecuting witness's sexual behavior
on [the date in question]i-fondling their genitals, trying to get
them to engage in an orgy, and telling them where and when to
43 See, e.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1978); Kaplan v. State,
451 So. 2d 1386, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);Johnson v. State, 299 S.E.2d 416, 417
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. 1983); People v. Paquette,
319 N.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d 753, 754-55
(Minn. 1984); State v. Hill, 244 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1976); State v. Mason, 271 N.W.2d 470,
471-72 (Neb. 1978); State v. Wilhite, 294 S.E.2d 396, 399-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State
v. Wilmoth, 644 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
44 See, e.g., State v. Parker, 333 S.E.2d 515, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Nlothing in
the record indicates that the prosecutrix was in the habit of drinking with men at Sh-
booms and then returning with them to the law office for sex.").
45 See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 285 S.E.2d 547, 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (admitting testi-
mony "that the prosecutrix was known to be sexually active with a predilection for football
players").
46 See, e.g., Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386, 1391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Walden,
J., dissenting) (evidence "tends to show that the victim was disposed to have consensual sex
with others while at odds with her boyfriend" (emphasis omitted)).
47 Normative female sexuality encompasses sexual practices considered acceptable for
women. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text (identifying as outside the bounds
of normative female sexuality the following: prostitution, group sex, sadomasochism, sex
outside of monogamy, sex with perceived frequency, sex on the part of teenagers, and sex
deemed woman-initiated).
48 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49 State v. Shoffner, 302 S.E.2d 830, 832-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). North Carolina's
rape shield statute allows the admission of "evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so
distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter with
the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the act or acts
charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that
the complainant consented." N.C. GEN. STAr. ANN. § 8C-1, R. 412(b) (3) (West 2011).
14712012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1461
stop the car-was no different from the prosecuting witness's pat-
tern of sexual behavior. 50
Conceding that the prior "pattern of sexual behavior" was factu-
ally distinct from the defendants' version of events, 51 the court never-
theless concluded that the victim's modus operandi had been
satisfactorily established and, accordingly, showed consent on the oc-
casion in question.52
One rationale for rulings of this kind is that sexual consent can
"los[e] its unique... nontransferable character" under certain condi-
tions.53 Of course, it is hardly self-evident that consent should lose its
unique, nontransferable character. Instead, as a normative matter, we
might view consent as properly subject to perpetual renewal or revoca-
tion, depending on circumstance. 54
Placing this normative proposition to the side, I focus here on the
descriptive premise embedded in a modus operandi framework,
which I take to encompass the distinct but related concepts of habit,
predilection, and disposition. Apart from whether it should, can sex-
ual behavior be "patterned" in a manner that meaningfully bears on
the likelihood of future consent?55
50 Shoffner, 302 S.E.2d at 833.
51 Id. ("We do not believe the Rape Victim Shield Statute requires the prior sexual
behavior of a complainant to parallel on all fours a defendant's version of the prosecuting
witness's sexual behavior at the time in question.").
52 Id. at 832-33.
53 Berger, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the
Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REv. 418, 430 (1976)). Vivian Berger more fully advanced
the argument in her influential article on rape shield laws. Berger wrote of the probative
value of evidence that a victim "habitually goes to bars on Saturday nights, picks up stran-
gers and takes them home to bed with her." Id. at 59. She posited:
In these situations, where proof of prior sexual conduct pertains narrowly
to acts evincing a pattern of voluntary encounters characterized by distinc-
tive facts similar to the current charges, one cannot cavalierly assume that a
woman's behavior on one occasion has no relationship at all to her conduct
and state of mind on another. On the contrary, her actions tend to "prove
that consent to intercourse for her has lost its unique ... nontransferable
character" when these particular conditions obtain. Naturally it would be
hard to define exactly what constitutes such a pattern. In determining rele-
vance, "the logical powers employed must be those of everyday life, not those
of the trained logician or scientist." The courts have, however, succeeded
in administering a somewhat analogous exception to the rule excluding
proof of the defendant's prior crimes. This loophole allows for the use of
such acts where the modus operandi is quite unique ....
Id. at 60 (footnotes omitted).
54 Anderson, supra note 33, at 101. Michelle Anderson has argued that sexual con-
sent "must be uniquely obtained by each individual," and that to do otherwise "gives insuf-
ficient weight to a woman's sexual autonomy." Id. at 100.
55 This Article treats the admissibility of a victim's past consensual sexual behavior. It
does not address evidentiary issues raised by a defendant's past sexual misconduct, which
raises separate issues. Cf Myrna Raeder, Excluding Sexual Pattern Evidence of Rape Complain-
ants Mhen the Defense Is Consent, JOTWELL (Nov. 28, 2011), http://crim.jotwell.com/2011/
11/ ("[S]omejudges who are in jurisdictions where evidence of the defendant's prior sex-
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Because courts consistently neglect to articulate the inferential
reasoning underlying the admission of a victim's past sexual behavior,
any rational basis for concluding that patterned conduct increases the
likelihood of her consent to the alleged rape must be inferred. We
can consider a number of evidentiary precedents that might support
this foundation.
First is the notion endorsed by some courts that sexual patterns
are akin to habits. 56 To avoid the character inference prohibited by
rape shield laws-that "promiscuous" women are more likely to con-
sent to any given sexual act-one might surmise from the exception
that women can become so accustomed to engaging in particular be-
haviors that they begin to do so reflexively, in a virtually automatic
manner. Just as one signals before changing lanes or brushes one's
teeth upon waking (classic examples of habit evidence), a woman
might repeatedly meet different men in the same bar, agree to accom-
pany them home, and there consent to intercourse-all the while en-
gaging in nonpurposive conduct.
But sexual consent is not like descending a particular stairway two
steps at a time. 57 There are a number of reasons why, but for present
purposes, 58 it can be simply noted that consent has a distinctly voli-
tional character, which undermines its invariability and thus its proba-
tive value.59 On closer inspection, the suggestion that sexual conduct
can be indiscriminate to the point where it equates with the habitual is
implausible.
Second is the hypothesis that one's sexual choices might be suffi-
ciently peculiar as to remove them altogether from the realm of nor-
mal sexual activity. The argument here is not that sexual patterns are
sexual habits, but that they are not truly sexual at all-at least in rela-
tion to sex that is considered ordinary, conventional, or regular. If
sexual conduct is abnormal in the extreme, it may be thought to arise
from a deep-seated malfunction, such as a compulsion. 60
ual acts are widely admitted are more willing to admit pattern evidence of complainants.
In other words, they consider it unfair that the complainant and the defendant are treated
so differently, although the rationales for rape shields and bad act evidence are completely
dissimilar.").
56 See State v. Parker, 333 S.E.2d 515, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
57 See KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195, at 322 (6th ed.
2006) (citing descending a stairway two steps at a time as a type of habitual behavior).
58 For more thorough discussion, see infra Part IV.A.
59 As the Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 406 ("Habit; Routine Practice")
observes, "the very volitional basis of [an] activity raises serious questions as to its invariable
nature, and hence its probative value." FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note (quot-
ing Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265, 272 (1964)).
60 See infra note 193 (discussing recent empirical work disentangling sexual wanting
from sexual consent).
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The closest evidentiary analogues (and those expressly advanced
by courts61) are to "common plan ' 62 or modus operandi, which allow
courts to admit a defendant's prior bad acts notwithstanding the rule
prohibiting the introduction of character evidence. 63 Generally, with
respect to modus operandi, such evidence is thought to bear on the
question of identity64 if it is sufficiently distinct or peculiar as to consti-
tute a veritable "signature."65 If a defendant committed a bizarre act
in the past-such as setting fire to a playground structure by igniting
nail polish remover-it is more likely that he is the person who set fire
to a playground structure with nail polish remover on this occasion.
With respect to criminal behavior, this inference may well be war-
ranted. 66 But in the domain of sexuality, it seems unlikely. Here, the
identity of the victim is not at issue (much less the identity of the de-
fendant), and consensual sex is not antisocial behavior.67
Since analogy to familiar evidential reasoning fails, we are back
where we started. At times, a sexual act is deemed patterned and thus
qualitatively different from the conduct to which rape shield rules
squarely address themselves. This classification cannot be understood
by reference to traditional evidence rules. Instead, as I argue in the
next Part, deviancy is quietly functioning as a justification for dimin-
ished legal protection of unapproved sexual behaviors. 68
Before turning to the modern treatment of sexual patterns, it is
worth considering the construct of sexual deviancy that courts em-
ploy. In particular, we might wonder if this construct derives from
61 See cases cited supra notes 44-46; see also State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867-69
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (viewing the determination of admissibility of a victim's sexual his-
tory as a balance between probative value and prejudicial value).
62 BROWN ET AL., supra note 57, § 190, at 315. To qualify for admission as such, each
act "should be an integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed by
the defendant." Id.
63 See FED. R. EvIo. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion .... ").
64 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... ").
65 Evidence may be admitted "[t]o prove other crimes by the accused so nearly identi-
cal in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused .... The pattern and
characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature."
BROWN ET AL., supra note 57, § 190, at 315.
66 But see Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REv. 777, 781-94 (1981) (arguing that inferences based on a criminal
defendant's past criminal acts serve "no useful purpose").
67 This assertion is not inconsistent with the notion that consensual sex can be un-
wanted by, and thereby harmful to, women. See Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 233-40 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wert-
heimer eds., 2010).
68 See infra Part II.A.
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statistical probabilities or from moral judgment. If the concern is
how, as a general proposition, women do or do not behave sexually
(statistical deviancy), we would want to know how judges are defining
a sexual activity as unusual enough to give rise to patterned consent.
The first, rather obvious point is that the relevant data is unknown
and judges' personal experience hardly allows for fair extrapolation. 69
But a second, more subtle and fundamental hitch lies in the assump-
tions underlying the suggestion that statistical deviancy is probative of
patterned consent.7 0 If, as I will show, these assumptions are them-
selves unwarranted' 7 1 faulty estimations of the statistical odds are only
a secondary pitfall. 72
Thus, even if judges could avoid proceeding from idealized fe-
male sexuality,73 the available heuristic is hardly of value: guesswork
about how female subjects behave in the world. Whether perceptions
of moral or statistical deviancy frame judicial decision making, the
outcome is much the same. Both processes are irrational; regardless,
each tends to result in a similar conclusion and female sexuality is
constructed by normative assessments (rather than described).74
69 See RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) ("[J]udges know next to nothing
about the subject [of sex] beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps
more so than average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much (not en-
tirely, of course) screened out of the judiciary ...."). Of course, the problem of extrapola-
tion from one's own sexual experiences is not limited to the judiciary.
70 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (discussing the contingency of
consent).
72 As a practical matter, the distinction between statistical and moral deviancy may be
a false one. In some cases, judges may think they are answering the question of how wo-
men generally do or do not behave. But, even so, judicial impressions of how women ought
to behave sexually (moral deviancy) cannot help but frame the inquiry. Indeed, in many
cases, judges come surprisingly close to acknowledging that their ideas about sexual pat-
terns are steeped in morality. Forjust one recent example, see Gagne v. Booker, 606 F.3d
278, 292 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge,J., concurring) (admitting to "not hold[ing] a torch
for anyone involved in the underlying events of [the] case"), rev'd en banc, Gagne v. Booker,
680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012). See also infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (charac-
terizing victim's prior consensual sex as "misconduct").
73 See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
74 Legally constructed sexuality has far reaching implications outside the law. This
proposition finds support in the academic commentary on social norms. See generally Dan
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. Rrv. 349, 394-95 (1997)
(discussing the role of social influence on individuals' decisions to commit crimes); Law-
rence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cvi. L. REv. 943, 1019-25 (1995) (ana-
lyzing the role of social meaning in the regulation of dangerous sex); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 427-32
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,
2033-36, 2050-53 (1996) (describing how laws may be designed to change existing social
norms and create new ones). I do not develop the point here, but simply note that this
influential body of literature provides theoretical foundations for an assumption that runs
throughout these pages-namely, that women's sexual desires and behaviors, as well as
their social meanings, are impacted by the law's normative expressions. Put simply, the
legal construction of female sexuality matters. See Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Roth-
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In short, intuitions regarding the appropriate bounds of female
sexuality influence, and perhaps even dictate, judgments about devi-
ance.75 Though these boundaries have shifted considerably since pre-
rape shield days, 76 their very persistence reflects and operationalizes a
patriarchal conception of women as decidedly limited sexual agents. 77
This conception maintains its hold on judicial imaginations78 just as it
reinscribes control over women's sexuality.79
II
SEXUAL PATTERNS IN LIFE AND LAW
We now examine the modern day sexual pattern exception,
which reflects and reifies particular understandings of sexual norms
and women's departures from them. Critical to this law's functioning
is an invisible baseline against which women's sexual conduct is
man, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 813-14 (2010) (challenging the existing
legal discourse on the proper arrangement of sexual interactions and relationships).
75 A vast literature on social cognition documents distortions in human reasoning
processes, including those of judges. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias
We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1378 (2010) (discussing how situational frames prejudice
parties who appear before courts); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1253
(2004) (describing the role of schemas in shaping the views of individuals who participate
in the legal system); Jon Hanson & David Yosifson, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 51-52 (2004) (explaining the benefits and
drawbacks of knowledge structures in helping individuals understand the world around
them); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cognition and the Law
3-14 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 09-26, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1458678 (summarizing the empirical science underly-
ing social cognition in the legal context); see also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6, 43 (2007) (proposing an "intuitive-over-
ride" model of judicial decision making, which posits that judges usually make intuitive
decisions but sometimes override their intuitions with deliberation). Although my orienta-
tion here is somewhat more structural, insofar as it emphasizes the effects of patriarchal
norms when locating the sources of flawed reasoning processes, it is also consistent with
many of the insights of social cognition theory.
76 For a helpful historical overview, see Chamallas, supra note 18, at 784-90.
77 See id. at 788-89 (discussing the traditional double standard of sexual morality,
which subjected women to "harsh social penalties if they exerted sexual independence");
MaryJoe Frug, Commentary, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1048-66 (1992) (identifying terrorization, maternalization, and sexual-
ization as legal mechanisms for constraining female sexual pleasure); infra note 237 and
accompanying text.
78 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINK-
INC AND REASONING 685, 690 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005) (legal
realism observes that "the law reflects historical, social, cultural, political, economic, and
psychological forces, and the behavior of individual legal decision makers is a product of
these forces").
79 As Sylvia Law has noted, "[g]endered assumptions about sexuality have long denied
women sexual gratification." Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 WIs. L. REV. 187, 210 (1988). Moreover, "[c]oncepts of sexuality are an important
element of the general gender script that destines men for 'serious' work in the world and
women for essential, but unvalued, lives caring for others." Id.; see supra note 77.
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judged. Regardless of where this boundary is located (and, as we will
see momentarily, this varies), it defines what I will call a presumption
of unrapeability°: certain sexual histories give rise to an inference
that the victim consented on the occasion in question, markedly di-
minishing the odds of a successful rape prosecution.
In parallel fashion, this concealed baseline establishes categories
of sexual conduct in which women may appropriately engage. Given
its meaning, then, we should carefully attend to how judges discern
where to fix this line. Before returning to this question,81 I provide a
comprehensive view of the applied pattern exception, and its
contradictions.
A. Deviancy and the Undoing of the Rape Shield
We first consider the case of Gagne v. Booker, just decided by the
Sixth Circuit rehearing en banc. 82 Two defendants were charged with
rape, and claimed that the victim consented to the intercourse. 83 At
trial, the state court excluded evidence that the woman had previously
engaged in joint consensual intercourse with one of the defendants-
whom she was dating at the time, though no longer when the alleged
rape occurred-and another man.84
The state appellate court affirmed the exclusion of this evidence,
reasoning as follows:
[T]he complainant's willing participation in a threesome with
Gagne and [a non-defendant] Bermudez is not probative of
whether she consented to a threesome with Gagne and Swathwood
[the codefendant] on the night of the alleged offense. Notably, the
80 The notion of unrapeability has been employed to describe the aggregate effects of
pervasive biases in law and society. For instance, black women, married women, prosti-
tutes, and gay men have been, and to varying extents continue to be, unrapeable. See, e.g.,
CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATrHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE
WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 229 (2000); Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2010).
81 See infra Part III.B.
82 Gagne v. Booker, 606 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, Gagne v. Booker, 680
F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012).
83 See id. at 496-97.
84 People v. Swathwood, Nos. 235540, 235541, 2003 WL 1880143, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2003). Michigan's rape shield statute reads in part:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted.., unless and only to the
extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is ma-
terial to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudi-
cial nature does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source
or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 2004).
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threesome involving Bermudez occurred while the complainant
and Gagne were still dating. The instant offense occurred after they
had ended their relationship, and it involved Swathwood, not
Bermudez. In light of the lack of similarity between the Bermudez
threesome and the instant offense, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. 85
Before rehearing, the Sixth Circuit panel felt this conclusion was
not only error; it also reflected an unreasonable application of federal
law. Notwithstanding the highly deferential standard of habeas review
required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),86 the panel majority found that the trial court's exclusion
of prior sexual history evidence deprived the defendant of a meaning-
ful opportunity to present a defense. 8 7 In short, Gagne was constitu-
tionally entitled to have evidence of the victim's previous consensual
threesome admitted.
The court based this conclusion on an unsupported assertion
that echoes throughout the case law: "[T] he excluded evidence was
not just relevant to this case, it was in all likelihood the most relevant
evidence regarding the sole contested issue at trial-an issue about
which there was not much evidence in the first place. [88] We believe
85 Swathwood, 2003 WL 1880143, at *2.
86 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Under the AEDPA, the phrase "unreasonable application" of
Supreme Court precedent means that the state court "identifie[d] the correct governing
legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle
to the facts" of the case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). "[A] federal habeas
court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judg-
ment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law errone-
ously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Even "a firm conviction that the state court was
erroneous" is not enough. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, "the state court's application of clearly established federal law
[must be] objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
87 Gagne, 606 F.3d. at 289.
88 Id. at 287-88. What the court referred to as "not much evidence in the first place"
was an evidentiary record quite common in acquaintance-rape cases: "Other than the two
defendants and the complainant, there were no eyewitnesses at all. Nor did the physical
evidence tend weigh [sic] in favor of one side or the other." Id. The court observed skepti-
cally that, "the question of guilt or innocence turned almost entirely on the credibility of
the victim's testimony regarding consent." Id. at 289. Again, this is typical of acquaintance-
rape prosecutions. As Susan Estrich has noted:
In a rape, corroboration may be impossible to find. In most cases, there are
no witnesses .... There is no contraband-no drugs, no marked money,
no stolen goods. Unless the victim actively resists, her clothes may be un-
torn and her body unmarked. Medical corroboration may establish the fact
of penetration, but that only proves that the victim engaged in inter-
course-not that it was nonconsensual or that this defendant was the man
involved. Moreover, the availability of medical corroboration turns not
only on prompt and appropriate treatment by police and medical person-
nel but, in the first instance, on the victim not doing what interviews find to
be the most immediate response of many rape victims: bathing, douching,
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it was indispensable to the defense's theory . " 89 The court pro-
vided no further explanation.
The concurring judge expressly observed that, because one of the
defendants participated in both the prior activities and the alleged
rape, the inference that underlay the admission of past consensual sex
with the defendant applied.90 Yet the concurrence neglected to ad-
dress the significant factual differences between the two incidents
(which the state court emphasized, affirming the exclusion).91 If
these differences did not undermine the probative value of the prior
act, what supported the reasoning that equated the two? What ne-
gated the reasoning that distinguished them?
Perhaps the answer lies in the judge's opinion of the victim. The
evidence admitted at trial that was key, in the judge's view, included
the fact that on a prior occasion while she was dating Gagne, the vic-
tim had "engaged in oral sex with Swathwood shortly after intercourse
with Gagne."9 2 The victim had also "engaged in consensual oral sex
with Gagne minutes before the very incident for which he was con-
victed (and moreover. .. she had drunk a pint of vodka and nine or
so beers and smoked crack in the hours before the incident)."93 In a
particularly telling passage, the concurring judge concluded with can-
dor: "I entirely agree that Michigan's rape-shield law protects impor-
tant state interests in the vast majority of cases in which it is
implicated. But I submit that, under the circumstances of this trial,
brushing her teeth, gargling. On the surface, at least, rape appears to be a
crime for which corroboration may be uniquely absent.
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1175 (1986).
89 Gagne, 606 F.3d at 288.
90 Id. at 290 (Kethledge,J., concurring). The concurrence added: "[Rape shield] laws
contain[ ] an exception for evidence of consensual sex with the defendant. These laws
must infer something very important about such evidence; and they do so especially in
cases-like this one-where consent itself is the issue. The inference is that, in some (and
perhaps most) cases, evidence of past consensual sex with the defendant is highly relevant
to the issue of consent in the incident giving rise to the charge." Id.
91 People v. Gagne, 673 N.W.2d 755, 755 (Mich. 2003).
92 Gagne, 606 F.3d at 292 (Kethledge, J., concurring).
93 Id. The admissibility of this evidence was not in dispute on Gagne's appeal because
the trial judge admitted it, presumably under the Michigan rape shield law exception for
"[e]vidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor" where such evidence's pro-
bative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520j (West 2004); see Gagne, 606 F.3d at 281 (discussing Gagne's motion in-limine
pursuant to section 750.520j); see also FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(l)(B) (defining the federal
analogue thereof). The court apparently referred to this evidence, not because it was
thought to bear on the probative value of the prior evidence of group sex, but because it
suggested that the state interest in the rape shield was gutted where other evidence involv-
ing such sordid facts had already been admitted. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying
text (discussing the connection between the notions of deviancy and the pattern exception
in the context of the Gagne case).
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there was virtually nothing left of those interests to protect."9 4 In
short, "the circumstances of this trial" abrogated the rationale for the
rape shield, limiting its scope to cases in which the victim's past con-
sensual sexual conduct is considered normal.95
Charging that the holding "in effect, invalidates all rape shield
laws as violative of the Sixth Amendment,"96 Chief Judge Alice Batch-
elder dissented. The practical consequences of the holding were dire,
notwithstanding considerable efforts on the part of the majority to
proclaim otherwise. 97 From this perspective, the misguided opinion
was especially outrageous because it manifested utter "condemnation
of the rape-shield concept."98
Two years after the habeas grant was affirmed, a fractured en
banc court reversed the panel. In no less than eight opinions, none of
which commanded a majority, the Sixth Circuitjudges expressed com-
peting views of the victim's sexual history. Apart from considerable
debate about the proper AEDPA standard of review,99 the court was
sharply divided in its assessment of the probative value of the ex-
cluded threesome evidence.
For the five dissenters, who echoed the reasoning of the panel,
the earlier encounter was "[t]he only evidence with which Gagne
could realistically defend himself;" 100 it was indeed "indispensable to
the defendant's ability to demonstrate his innocence."10 1 From this
vantage, the prior threesome was "critical" evidence because it in-
volved "almost identical"10 2 or "nearly identical" 10 3 sexual conduct,
despite the participation of a different man 104 and real factual ambi-
guities surrounding the use of the word "identical" to describe the acts
94 Gagne, 606 F.3d at 292. Nevertheless, the concurring judge admitted, "I do not
hold a torch for anyone involved in the underlying events of this case." Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 301 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
97 Responding to the dissent's dramatic prognostication, the majority took pains to
"stress that our holding is fact-bound in the extreme." Id. at 288.
98 Id. at 293.
99 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (defining the AEDPA standard of review).
The plurality opinion, authored by Chief Judge Batchelder, repeatedly underscored the
level of deference required by AEDPA. See, e.g., Gagne v. Booker, 680 F.3d 493, 517 (2012)
("It might be that Gagne is correct that, as a matter of his defense, this was the most
relevant evidence and the state courts were wrong to exclude it, but whether the trial judge
was right or wrong is not the pertinent question under AEDPA. The question is whether
the last state court's decision was objectively unreasonable." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (internal citations omitted)).
100 Gagne, 680 F.3d at 534 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 536.
102 Id. at 533.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (noting that the defendant's argument for admissi-
bility "omit[ted] from consideration the identity of any other participant in the group sex
and, instead, define[d] 'group sex' as just a type of sex or sex act").
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in question. 10 5 Because of its perceived similarity to the incident in
question, the excluded evidence demonstrated "the complainant's
willingness to specifically engage in the kind of facially coercive three-
way sex"'1 6 alleged to be rape in this case.
Several of the five concurring opinions-three of which con-
curred in the judgment only-expressed skepticism about the signifi-
cance of the victim's sexual history: "Gagne's proffered evidence is not
as probative as he submits once it is stripped of the forbidden infer-
ence that a woman who consents once to group sex is more likely to
consent to it in the future; ' 10 7 "I do not find the excluded evidence so
compelling;"' 0 8 "The only bridge to finding evidence of consensual
sex between [the victim] and Bermudez material to whether [the vic-
tim] had consensual sex with Gagne ... is to conclude that the kind of
women who would say 'yes' to someone is the kind of woman who
always says 'yes.'"'109 One judge cautioned, "the logic espoused by the
dissent opens the door to prior sexual conduct of the victim being
admissible, as a constitutional requirement, whenever the sexual con-
duct at issue is outside the norm."110
The plurality chose to ignore this possibility, accepting arguendo
the potential probative value of sexual patterns evidence. Although it
was not "unreasonable to surmise that [ ] jurors would be more likely
to find consent" if they learned about the victim's repeated participa-
tion in consensual group sex, a decision to the contrary was not "be-
yond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." '111 Because the
panel opinion did not afford the requisite deference to the state
court, it was reversed. But Gagne left intact the sexual patterns excep-
105 According to the defense proffer, "the events alleged by [Bermudez] is [sic] nearly
identical in most regards. There are some exceptions, but the general M.O. if you will, the
way that the event took place is almost identical to the way that the events charged in this
case took place." Id. at 522 (MooreJ., concurring). Since a factual record was never devel-
oped regarding the victim's "M.O." and the "exceptions," judges to whom it mattered were
left to speculate as to the meaning of "almost identical." Compare id. at 533 (Kethledge,J.,
dissenting) ("Non-brutal three-way sex is not 'almost identical' or 'nearly identical' to bru-
tal three-way sex. And thus it is simply not an accurate reading of the record to say that the
Bermudez incident, as described in the proffer, was less brutal than the charged inci-
dent."), with id. at 522 (Moore, J., concurring). ("At no point did defense counsel, either
in his papers or at the hearing, characterize the Bermudez incident as 'brutal' or 'violent'
in any way, and the defense certainly did not proffer that the Bermudez incident left the
victim bleeding and with bruises all over her body."). In the earlier panel opinion af-
firming the habeas grant, no mention was made of any violence or brutality possibly associ-
ated with the prior threesome. Gange v. Booker, 606 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd en
banc, Gagne v. Booker, 680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012).
106 Gagne, 680 F.3d at 532 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 518 (Sutton, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 522 (Moore, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 524 (Clay, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 520 (Griffin, J., concurring).
111 Id. at 517-18 (plurality opinion).
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tion, at least in part because a hard look at its conceptual foundations
would have yielded little consensus.
Divergent understandings of import of the victim's prior consen-
sual threesome correspond to deeper disagreements about unconven-
tional female sexuality. For judges inclined to afford the excluded
evidence substantial weight, and even for those who see the admissibil-
ity question as exceedingly close (and therefore outside the scope of
AEDPA review), the sexual conduct at issue is different enough from
the norm to somehow alter standard rape shield analysis. The result is
a mode of discourse animated not just by notions of promiscuity, but
also by an intuitive sense of deviancy. 112 While judicial interpretations
of the "outlandish sexual encounter" 1" 3 are modernized-in this
sense, Gagne's threesome may be just the "one night thing"'1 4 of a
bygone era-the idea of sexual outlandishness remains, as does its
function in establishing the inapplicability of rape shield protection.
Though normally past consent is irrelevant, under specified circum-
stances, consent forecasts more of the same. The law of rape shield
thus perpetuates in evolving guises the very assumption that it pur-
ports to reject: a woman's sexual past may indeed bear on the likeli-
hood that she would consent to an act she now alleges was rape.
As is generally true of the law of sexual patterns,11 5 the path of
Gagne shows how the scope of rape shield protection is defined by
reference to unmentioned, imagined benchmarks of acceptable fe-
male sexuality. If we look carefully, we see that often judges are not
really reasoning about consent at all; rather, they are identifying per-
ceived sexual deviancy,1 16 then using this designation to advance the
evidentiary proposition that connects past consent to present consent.
Read together, the en banc opinions capture the paradox at the heart
of the sexual pattern exception: cabining its reasoning can be accom-
plished only if judges are willing to circumscribe female sexuality.
In the modern pattern jurisprudence, judicial perspectives on
normative female sexuality are increasingly contested, but-as we
have already seen-familiar conceptual tensions recur." 7 For in-
stance, compare Gagne with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Sandoval v.
112 See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text (elaborating on the idea that judicial
notions of deviancy are animated by an intuitive sense of how women ought to behave
sexually).
113 Gagne, 606 F.3d at 291 (Kethledge, J., concurring).
114 See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Pancoast, 596 So. 2d
162, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam), in which the past sexual encounters char-
acterized as a "one night thing" were deemed admissible).
115 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
116 This deviancy can be statistical or moral. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text (further explaining the distinction and its importance).
117 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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Acevedo. i t8 Judge Posner authored the opinion, which concerned the
admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior consensual anal inter-
course with a third party in a prosecution alleging forcible anal
intercourse.
Here, as in Gagne, the defense was consent and the case hinged
on the victim's credibility.' 19 ButJudge Posner expressly disputed the
probative value of the prior history evidence, writing as follows:
The essential insight behind the rape shield statute is that in an age
of post-Victorian sexual practice, in which most unmarried young
women are sexually active, the fact that a woman has voluntarily en-
gaged in a particular sexual activity on previous occasions does not
provide appreciable support for an inference that she consented to
engage in this activity with the defendant on the occasion on which
she claims that she was raped.
The fact that [the victim] had had pleasurable anal intercourse with
another man on another occasion would not show that she would
have enjoyed having it with Sandoval on an occasion when he was
enraged with her and wanted by penetrating her anally to humiliate
and, quite possibly, physically hurt her. Indeed, by that logic rape
shield laws would be unconstitutional to the core because their cen-
tral aim is to prevent the drawing of an inference of consent from
previous consensual intercourse with other men. 120
One wonders about a principled basis for distinguishing the di-
vergent treatment of the prior consensual sex acts in Gagne and Sando-
val. Is the difference that anal sex is more common than three-way
sex?1 2 1 Or that it is more acceptable? At bottom, Judge Posner con-
fronted the very same dilemma facing the court in Gagne-how can
some past consensual sexual activities bear on consent, if not all do so;
or, conversely, if some past consensual sexual activities with third par-
ties are excluded on the issue of consent, why aren't all excluded?
Sandoval faced the tension squarely and without apparent commit-
ment to a normative vision of female sexuality. Accordingly, the court
deliberately refused to identify consensual conduct, whatever the fla-
118 996 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1993).
119 Compare id. at 147-48 ("The only direct evidence of Sandoval's gtiilt was the testi-
mony of his victim . . . Sandoval testified that. . . she . . . had initiated anal and oral sex
with him."), with Gagne v. Booker, 606 F.3d 278, 287 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, Gagne v.
Booker, 680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he entire trial hinged upon consent .... Other
than the two defendants and the complainant, there were no eyewitnesses at all. Nor did
the physical evidence tend weigh [sic] in favor of one side or the other."). See supra note
88 and accompanying text (noting the typicality of this fact pattern).
120 Sandoval, 996 F.2d at 149, 151.
121 See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text (citing statistics on frequency of anal
intercourse). To my knowledge, no comparable study assessing the frequency of multi-
partner sex exists.
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vor, as sufficiently deviant to exempt it from rape shield protection.
Gagne, as we have seen, resolved the question far more equivocally.
In other cases, judicial impressions of normative female sexuality
impliedly dictate the admissibility determination (with little to no
analysis), creating a conceptual muddle. The confusion derives from
the sexual pattern exception itself, rather than its faulty application.
One cannot logically square the exception with the rule of exclusion
to which it is tethered. To further illustrate this deep tension, I shall
juxtapose against the law of sexual patterns examples from two differ-
ent areas of rape law.
B. Choosing a Particular Membrum Virile
The identity of a woman's sexual partner greatly impacts her will-
ingness to consent to sexual activities. This belief animates juridical
commitments to both the core rape shield protection and its main
exception for past intercourse with the defendant.1 22 The central in-
sight of rape shield law-that consent on one occasion is of limited
probative value on the question of subsequent consent-is intricately
connected to an understanding of sexual consent as partner spe-
cific. 123 A woman's choice to engage sexually with a particular individ-
ual, as opposed to another, is considered unassailable; the general
prohibition on past sexual acts with others to show consent to acts
with the defendant codifies this perspective.
Usually the law privileges identity as foundational to the norm of
nontransferable consent with little fanfare. One court to expressly in-
sist that identity matters (if only because of the unusual facts
presented) is the Court of Military Appeals in Traylor.124 The facts are
recounted as follows:
[Traylor] and Specialist G were assigned to the same squad, which
had deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm. They
were acquainted but did not usually work together or socialize.
On January 5, 1991, at almost 3:00 a.m., Specialist G was awakened
by Specialist Sly, who asked her to meet him outside. They boarded
a vacant bus parked nearby, talked for 5-10 minutes in the rear of
the bus, and then began engaging in sexual intercourse. After a few
minutes, they changed positions so that Specialist G had her knees
on the edge of a seat and her head toward the side of the bus, with
Specialist Sly behind her engaging in vaginal intercourse from the
rear.
122 See supra note 93 (describing the exception); infra notes 217-19 and accompanying
text (suggesting conceptual limitations of the exception).
123 For further discussion of the significance of the traits of a sexual partner, see infra
notes 215-19 and accompanying text (describing the "partner-personal" realm).
124 United States v. Traylor, 40 MJ. 248, 249 (C.M.A. 1994).
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Specialist G testified that Specialist Sly "slipped out but immediately
reentered" two-three times. She testified that "he slipped out one
more time and I thought it was him reentering but something felt
different this time." She turned her head and saw that appellant
had entered her. She testified that she "was shocked... mad, upset,
and Ijust-all I said was, 'Hey, Traylor, what's going on?"' She tes-
tified that she "tried to pull away a little," but appellant "pulled me
back."1 2
5
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a finding of nonconsent because the victim was en-
gaging in consensual intercourse with Sly at the time the defendant
entered her. The court disagreed, observing that, "'[a] ctual consent'
means consent not only to the act of intercourse, but also consent
'based on the identity of the prospective partner."'126 To dispel any
remaining confusion, the court concluded: "It is not necessary that a
woman know the true identity of her sexual partner or know anything
about him in order to consent, but she must be agreeable to the pene-
tration of her body by a particular membrum virile."'127
Putting aside whether this thin conception of identity is sufficient
as a normative matter, 12 8 Traylor is an easy case for the law of rape.
The bounds of consent are far more clear and confined than they
would be had Specialist Sly shifted from vaginal intercourse to ab-
ruptly penetrate Specialist G anally, or failed to withdraw when told to
do so. 1 29 She chose a "particular 'membrum virile' "; the law affords that
choice profound meaning when assessing the probability of consent
with another. Unless, as we have seen, the behavior itself is consid-
ered outlandish, in which case the significance of identity dissipates.
C. (Un)reasonable Mistakes About Consent
When a rape defendant claims that he mistakenly believed the
woman consented to sex, he argues not that she actually consented,
but that his belief to the contrary was reasonable. 130 Though many
jurisdictions do not provide for a mistake defense to a rape prosecu-
125 Id. at 248-49.
126 Id. at 249 (quoting United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114, 116 (C.M.A. 1987)).
127 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. Riv. 39, 44-47
(1998) (discussing fraudulent conduct in rape); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Lit-
tle, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'". A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv.
374, 417-18 (1993) (discussing a proposed tort of sexual fraud).
129 See generally Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: "No" Means "No," but
What Does "Yes" Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2341, 2341-43 (2004) (exploring how to define
affirmative consent).
130 See generally Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 270-71 (2002) (discussing the defendant's perceptions of the vic-
tim's consent).
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tion,1 31 those that do place limits on the type of evidence that the
defense allows.
As the Fourth Circuit has described this area of law:
A defendant's reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that the victim
consented may constitute a defense to rape. When consent is the
issue, however, [the applicable rule] permits only evidence of the
defendant's past experience with the victim. The rule manifests the
policy that it is unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of
consent on the victim's past sexual experiences with third
persons .... 132
Suppose a defendant asserts that he wrongly believed the alleged
rape victim consented to anal sex (or group sex, or any sex act
deemed similar to the conduct at issue). Further suppose that the
defendant's contention is based solely on his knowledge that, on a
number of occasions in the past, the woman willingly engaged in this
same act with other men. Most courts, in keeping with the Fourth
Circuit's characterization,1 33 would not find an entitlement to a rea-
sonable mistake of fact instruction under these circumstances.
3 4
In part, this may be because judges accurately perceive that an
opposite result would run directly counter to essential rape shield
norms. But the rejection of a mistake defense under these circum-
stances can also be understood as affirmation of this proposition; it is
not reasonable for a man to assume that a woman would consent to X
with him simply because she had on one or more past occasion con-
131 See id. at 280-81. See generally Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of
Mistake of Fact about Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 817-32 (1996)
(identifying the development of mistake defenses).
132 United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
133 In Saunders, the Fourth Circuit held that, to prove his reasonable belief in consent,
the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to present evidence of a conversation with a
friend in which he learned that the victim "was a 'skeezer' and that [the friend] had had
sex with [the victim] in exchange for drugs." Id. at 390.
134 See, e.g., United States v. Maksimenko, No. 05-80187, 2007 WL 522708, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 14, 2007) (granting government's motion in-limine to prohibit defendant from
introducing evidence of victims' sexual behavior, other than that involving defendant, or
their profession as exotic dancers, and noting that "it is unreasonable for a defendant to
base his belief of consent on the victim's past sexual experiences with third persons");
United States v. Watt, 50 M.J. 102, 105 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (noting in dicta that "the defen-
dant's beliefs about the victim's sexual relations, if any, with persons unknown to him, were
not relevant to whether the victim was actually consenting with him at that time" (citing
United States v. Greaves, 40 M.J. 432, 437-38 (C.M.A. 1994))); United States v. Knox, 41
M.J. 28, 30 (C.M.A. 1994) (permitting defendant to present evidence of his own exper-
iences with the victim, but not evidence of her reputation as a "bimbo" who was "very easy"
and who had reputedly passed a sexually transmitted disease to defendant's coworkers);
Boyd v. State, 564 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ind. 1991) (holding that "freewheeling, aggressive
behavior" of the victim in a tavern did not warrant a jury instruction on mistake of fact
regarding consent).
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sented to X with another.1 3 5 Put differently, sound reasoning does
not support such an assumption. 13 6
The law provides no explanation of why, in evidentiary determi-
nations involving sexual patterns, this logic is inverted. If anything, we
might expect the reasonable mistake defense to allow for more con-
sideration of sexual history than would the actual consent defense. 137
This contradiction adds to the puzzle of why, when the issue is the
latter, certain sexual behaviors lend themselves to a judicial finding of
admissibility. Part III pursues this inquiry.
III
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE SEXUALITY
Judicial intuitions surrounding sexual patterns are highly suspect.
Absent an analytic framework for sexual history determinations,
judges must simply rely on their hunches. This would be problematic
regardless of who is doing the reckoning; it is particularly disturbing
when we consider the limitations of courts acting in this capacity. As
Judge Posner has candidly acknowledged: "J]udges know next to
nothing about the subject [of sex] beyond their own personal experi-
ence, which is limited, perhaps more so than average, because people
with irregular sex lives are pretty much (not entirely, of course)
screened out of the judiciary ....*"138
Gagne involved three-way sex. 139 And indeed group sexual activi-
ties constitute one category of evidence that proves particularly vexing
for judges. For instance, in a prosecution for rape by three defend-
ants, one Tennessee appeals court found a constitutional right to pre-
sent evidence that the victim "'had a threesome' with two men
[neither of whom was a defendant] behind a church." 140 The Court
concluded that the prior sex act was "relevant and crucial evidence as
to the alleged victim's willingness to consent to having sex with more
than one partner" for two reasons.1 41 First, sex with more than one
135 With respect to the reasonableness of the defendant's mistake, the probative value
of past consensual acts with the defendant (as opposed to others) may be far greater, de-
pending on context. See infra notes 184-230 and accompanying text (asserting primacy of
context for sexual consent).
136 See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
137 We might also suppose that judges would demand of themselves a more rigorous
analysis than they would demand of rape defendants.
138 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992). All of this lends the internally con-
flicted state of the sexual pattern exception-and, as a corollary, the extreme lack of gui-
dance it provides judges-greater urgency. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
140 State v. Johnson, No. M2001-01973-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 992402, at *7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 15, 2002). In Johnson, the state filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial
court's ruling admitting the evidence. Id. at *1.
141 Id. at *8.
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person was "unique behavior. ' 142 Second, notwithstanding obvious
discrepancies between the facts alleged at trial and the past "three-
some . . . behind a church," the two incidents were similar enough
merely by virtue of the fact that both "involved multiple partners.' 143
In another case raising the issue of consensual group sex, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal reversed a trial court
order admitting evidence of a fifteen-year-old girl's sexual history in a
case of forcible rape by ten defendants. 144 The court focused on the
fact that the prior activities in question always involved one young
man at a time-though, on occasion, others peered under and
through the door while the victim engaged in sexual acts with an-
other.145 The opinion rested explicitly on the court's definition of the
previous acts involved as "normal, individual sexual relations"- even
going so far as to cite a defendant's own pretrial testimony regarding
the past acts (again, which others did not participate in, but may have
observed). 146 The court seemed to agree with the defendant on this
point: "Nobody's no pervert. 147
The dissent would have affirmed the trial court's admission of the
testimony. Whether or not the conduct was "group sex,"1 48 because it
was watched, it fell outside the bounds of normative sexuality-and
was therefore deemed probative. 149 According to the dissent, the con-
clusion was self-evident: the victim's sexual history "in circumstances
which could be described as less than discrete [sic] and private is rele-
vant to the question whether she consented to the acts charged
against these defendants."1 50
Even in cases where the sex act itself is not itself considered
"unique behavior,' 15 1 it may still depart from the kind of "discrete
[sic] and private" behavior 152 that falls within the sphere of contin-
gent consent. Courts tacitly locate the point at which too much sex or
sex with the wrong people becomes sufficiently deviant to render it
patterned. 153
142 Id. The court went on to add that this behavior was unique, "especially for a person
the age of the alleged victim," who at the time "was a high school senior." Id. at *1, *8. But
see supra note 17 (presenting statistics on sexual conduct in girls between the ages of 15
and 19).
143 Johnson, 2002 WL 992402, at *7-8.
144 See State v. Sheard, 870 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ark. 1994).
145 See id.
146 Id. at 214.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 216-17 (Newbern, J., dissenting)
150 Id. at 216.
151 State v. Johnson, No. M2001-01973-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 992402, at *8 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 15, 2002).
152 Sheard, 870 S.W.2d at 216 (Newbern,J., dissenting).
153 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
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Here, too, retrograde notions of chastity powerfully influence ju-
dicial inquiry. Sex within a monogamous relationship 154 is generally
considered irrelevant to later consent with another man. 155 In con-
trast, sex outside such relationships (however mainstream the acts
themselves) may give rise to an inference of patterned behavior, in-
forming the likelihood of later consent-particularly if the victim is
considered the initiator of, as one court put it, a "one night thing."1 56
Often these rationales for defining sexual conduct as indiscreet
to the point of indiscriminateness merge. In one military review case,
for instance, the court found that the victim "was drunk practically
every weekend, and behaved in a sexually aggressive manner toward
males when drunk"; as such, this evidence demonstrated a "pattern of
behavior" and was "relevant, material, and probative."157 The court
noted that, "evidence that the victim consented to sex freely and indis-
criminately would be relevant to prove she acted in conformity with
her habit.' 58
154 While monogamy is still an important benchmark, sex outside of marriage in and
of itself is no longer considered as deviant as once it was. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral
Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 763 (2006) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas "dismantled an isomorphism between mar-
riage/nonmarriage and licit sex/illicit sex"); Ordover, supra note 37, at 99 ("[S]ociety that
no longer considers nonmarital sexual behavior immoral or even unusual .... "). This
shift evinces the temporally and culturally bound nature of judicial deviancy conceptions.
155 See, e.g., State v. Mustafa, 437 S.E.2d 906, 909-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming
the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's previous sexual encounter
with a man in an ongoing relationship).
156 State v. Pancoast, 596 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam). In
State v. Pancoast, the trial court entered an order allowing the admission of past-history
evidence, holding that the proffered evidence established that, over the course of the past
six years, the victim had engaged in a sexual "pattern." Id. The court's conclusion was
based on: (1) the (younger) ages of the three men involved (relative to the victim's age);
(2) the time of day of the encounters (night); (3) the type of sexual activity (which in-
cluded oral sex); (4) the relationship of the men to the victim's son (they were the son's
friends), and (5) "the nature of each encounter as a 'one night thing."' Id. In addition,
the three men involved "insinuate[d] that the victim initiated the encounters." Id. at 164.
On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court reversed, explaining that, "[w]hile ... all the
prior encounters occurred with men younger than the victim, this alone is insufficient to
establish a pattern of conduct warranting the admission of prior consensual sexual activ-
ity." Id. The ruling predated widespread attention to sexual relationships between women
in their 40s and 50s and younger men. See, e.g., Are More Older Women With Younger Men?,
ABC NEWS (May 5, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/Health/story?id=731599
(noting in 2005 the increasing number of women dating younger men).
157 United States v. Kelly, 33 MJ. 878, 882 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
158 Id. (citing United States v. Holliman, 16 M.J. 164, 166 (C.M.A. 1983). The refer-
enced passage reads in full: "Trial defense counsel adverted in his argument to Mil.R.Evid.
406, concerning evidence of 'habit,' and contended that'[i]f it is the habit of the victim to
consent to sex freely and indiscriminately, then this evidence would be relevant to prove
her conduct on this occasion was in conformity with this habit.' While the rationale may
be correct, the proffered evidence fell far short of establishing the 'habit' to which defense
counsel referred." Hollimon, 16 M.J. at 166 (alteration in original).
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In various ways, then, female sexuality that fails to conform to
normative standards159 sits uneasily with rape shield law. 160 Most dis-
comfiting are acts of prostitution,1 61 group sex,1 62 and sadomasoch-
ism. 163  In a similar manner, sex outside of monogamy, 64 sex with
perceived frequency, 165 sex on the part of teenagers,1 66 and sex
deemed woman initiated 167 are often considered sufficiently deviant
to be given patterned treatment.1 68  In these cases, the consent re-
quirement is diluted.1 69
159 For a more complete discussion of emotional intimacy as it impacts normative stan-
dards of female sexuality, see Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 74, at 825 (arguing that
the "new ground for restricting sexual conduct [is] the promotion of emotional intimacy.
As such, states may find reason to... penalize sexual activities that occur outside of accept-
able relationships or are otherwise assumed to play no role in the furtherance of emotional
intimacy even within relationships").
160 See, e.g., State v. Brodie, No. COA04-308, 2005 WL 1431686, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App.
June 21, 2005) (declining to decide the admissibility of the victim's admission to previous
intercourse in the presence of her child because the defendant first raised the issue on
appeal); State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 44, 47 (Tenn. 1997) (after an intermediate court
reversed because the excluded evidence "constitute [d] one episode of a distinctive pattern
in which the victim met an acquaintance at a bar, was drinking, and eventually had sexual
relations with that person," the state supreme court reinstated the conviction on grounds
that "[t]he described acts could hardly be characterized as signature cases"); cf State v.
Smart, No. 57129-0-I, 2007 WL 959891, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2007) (rejecting the
defendant's claim that the court wrongly excluded evidence that "sometimes [the victim]
would drink, hit on men she did not know, and then consent to sex," and that she "had
sexual relations with men she met over the Internet or on a camping trip[]" "[t]he prof-
fered evidence was not similar to [the defendant's] version of the incident because accord-
ing to him [the victim] was sober").
161 See generally Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses
of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 passim (1992) (challenging the dichotomy drawn
in legal discourse between prostitutes and other women).
162 See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
163 See Anderson, supra note 33, at 131-37; Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and
Violence in Criminal Law, 42 B.C. L. RFv. 239,285-86 (2001). But see State v. Archibald, Nos.
2006-L-047, 2006-L-207, 2007 WL 2758600, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2007). In Archi-
bald, the court grappled with the relevance of a victim's past attendance at a "pure ro-
mance party," which it defined as "apparently parties held by women for their female
friends at which they can purchase marital aids." Id. at *7. Though the issue was not
preserved on appeal, the court opined: "[W]e fail to see how the victim's alleged attend-
ance [at] a pure romance party is evidence that the victim had a proclivity for kinky sex.
Further, we do not agree that if a person was fond of kinky sex, this affinity would be
admissible to support a consent defense .... ".Id. at *9 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
164 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 142; see also State v. Whitehead, No. W2000-01062-CCA-R3-CD, 2001
WL 1042164, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2001) (describing evidentiary record con-
taining evidence of fifteen-year-old girl's prior sexual history, including consensual acts
with "several boys who were approximately her own age").
167 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
169 The de facto impossibility of a wife's nonconsent merits its own treatment. See gen-
erallyJill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REv.
1373 passim (2000) (describing the legal landscape surrounding marital rape).
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A final case crystallizes the flawed analytic framework underlying
the sexual pattern exception. The facts of Chew v. State, a Texas appel-
late decision, are described most fully by the dissenting opinion:
The state's evidence showed that on the night of March 26,
1988, the complainant was walking from a family party to her
nearby home when four men, including appellant, approached her
in a car. They asked her to go riding, but she declined. Two of
them then got out of the car and forced her into the back seat.
They then took her to a ranch where cockfights were taking place.
There she was raped and otherwise sexually abused in and on the
car by a number of men, including appellant. There was testimony
that in addition to raping her, appellant held a flashlight on her
while others raped her and also forced a beer bottle into her vagina.
Appellant and the others who had originally brought the complain-
ant to the ranch left her there and drove away. The complainant
was then taken to a second car by other men at the ranch, where the
sexual abuse continued. 170
At trial, the defense claimed that the victim consented to the acts
in question.17 1 Thejury convicted and the defendant appealed on the
basis of the trial judge's exclusion of evidence relating to the victim's
sexual conduct.172 At issue was what the appeals court characterized
as
testimony by a number of men describing numerous separate sexual
encounters between the complainant and several men at the same
time, which took place in the complainant's home, in other homes,
and in vehicles .... These men also testified that the complainant
not only participated willingly but at times instigated the sexual en-
counters, even with men who were complete strangers.1
73
The court reversed the conviction for rape and kidnapping, hold-
ing that, because the excluded evidence "had the potential to expose
facts from which the jurors could have appropriately drawn infer-
ences ... as to the consent of the complainant," it unconstitutionally
deprived the defendant of his right to meaningful confrontation.'
74
170 804 S.W.2d 633, 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc) (Peeples, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
172 Id. Somewhat unusual is that the proffered evidence pertained to acts occurring
after the alleged incident; accordingly, the state rape shield law-which governs "previous
sexual conduct" and "past sexual behavior"-was deemed inapplicable. Id. at 641 n.2
(Peeples, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding this oddity (and the dissent's observation that
"the tendered evidence certainly comes within the spirit of rule 412"), the admissibility of
evidence was analyzed on constitutional grounds (and ultimately found to be constitution-
ally required); hence, the relevant chronology is not significant for our purposes. Id.; id. at
638 (majority opinion).
173 Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
174 Id. at 637-38 ("The appellant was prevented from presenting the only defense he
had. Thus, this error alone requires that the case be reversed and remanded.").
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The court also found error in the trial judge's decision to curtail
the defendant's examination of Dr. Lawrence Taylor, "a qualified psy-
chiatrist with expertise in sexual disorders. ' 175 The testimony was ad-
mitted as follows:
Dr. Taylor described the illness of "nymphomania" as a condition
occasionally found in females, consisting of an unmanageable sex-
ual desire which results in dramatic frequency of sexual contact with
a partner as well as indiscriminate sexual contact with groups. Dr.
Taylor testified that it was not uncommon for females afflicted with
this illness to attempt to hide their condition from the general pub-
lic as well as from their own family, and further, that those afflicted
very seldom seek medical attention on their own.1 76
The evidence wrongly excluded, per the appellate court, in-
cluded the following offer of proof:
In the court's chambers, outside the hearing of the jury, Dr.
Taylor was posed a hypothetical question . . . about the complain-
ant's alleged consensual sexual misconduct subsequent to the occa-
sion in question. He responded that the facts were "in keeping with
a diagnosis of nymphomania." The doctor further testified that
when females afflicted with this illness are caught or confronted,
they have a tendency "to cover up you might say but that would not
stop them usually." He testified that he meant that such a person,
even after being caught or confronted, would usually "continue on
with the sexual promiscuity and the amount and number of
people."177
The victim's sexual conduct, or "misconduct," was not just evi-
dence of propensity, but of such extreme deviancy as to constitute a
"medical affliction," one that had "a direct connection with the de-
fense of consent. '178 Her sexuality was fully pathologized as "nympho-
175 Id. at 634.
176 Id.
177 Id. (emphasis added). By "sexual misconduct," the court was apparently referring
to the proffered evidence of "separate sexual encounters between the complainant and
several men at the same time, which took place in the complainant's home, in other
homes, and in vehicles." Id. What is remarkable about the characterization of these acts
as "misconduct" is that it lays bare the moral judgment that, in more typical cases, remains
just beneath the surface.
178 Id. at 638.
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mania," 179 a condition defined by "unmanageable sexual desire." 180
Here we see the unrapeability presumption1 8 1 in its most naked form:
"[A] female so afflicted could possibly be raped but . .. it was not
probable." 182
Though typically less visible, this presumption lurks throughout
the jurisprudence of sexual patterns.
IV
THE CONTINGENCY OF CONSENT
We have seen that judges divide the sexual universe into the con-
sensual, the nonconsensual, and what I shall term the aconsensual.
With aconsensual sex, consent is imputed from prior consensual sex
acts of a like nature.1 8 3 Judges implicitly set the boundaries of this
kind of sex, not through a process of reasoning, but by making thinly
disguised judgments about sexual normativity1 8 4 This casts in doubt
the law of sexual patterns.
Thus far, the critique has exposed fundamental problems with
the implementation of rape shield law. Given the futility of excising
normative judgments from judicial decision making around women's
179 Id. at 634. To be clear, Dr. Taylor never examined the victim in the case. Rather,
the in-court "nymphomania" diagnosis of which the court approves was based solely on
facts contained in a "hypothetical question.., about the complainant's alleged consensual
sexual misconduct subsequent to the occasion in question." Id.; see also supra note 177
(discussing court's use of "misconduct" to summarize the acts in question). It is also worth
noting that nymphomania is not a recognized diagnosis according to the American Psychi-
atric Association's official guide to mental illness, the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV; nor, more to the point, was nymphomania recognized by
the DSM-III-R, the reference manual current when the court decided Chew. See AM. PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed.
1994); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS:
DSM-III-R (3d ed., rev. 1987).
180 Chew, 804 S.W.2d at 634.
181 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
182 Chew, 804 S.W.2d at 634.
183 In this sphere, belief in the contingent functioning of consent is suspended.
184 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. This observation is also consistent with
the more general proposition that "relevance... depends on a decisionmaker's particular
worldview, itself deeply embedded in a social context." Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing
and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 959, 974 (2004); see also Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of
Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 604, 627 (1994) ("Evidence is not a set of things, as the conven-
tional theory would have it; it is instead the process by which fact finders come to conclu-
sions about the past."); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist
Reforms, 19 HLv. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 131 (1996) (" [it is not logic but cultural beliefs that
determine that the prior sexual history of a woman who alleges she has been raped is
relevant to the question of whether she 'in fact' consented on the occasion in issue."); Kit
Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-34 (1991) (arguing that the
evidentiary relevance rules discriminate against women by virtue of the fact that "relevance
is . .. in the eye of the beholder" and trial judges tend to "solidif[y] a white male
perspective").
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sexuality, 8 5 this failure might be reason enough to abandon the pat-
tern exception.
But the problems of the pattern evidence exception lie not just in
application; rather, the exception is conceptually flawed. Efforts to
discern probative value in previous sexual consent cannot be rational-
ized. 86 To test the proposition, let us pursue the following abstract
inquiry: Is a morally neutral stance on female sexuality consistent with
the notion that sexual consent on one occasion may be probative of
consent on another and that these circumstances can be divined
through a process of reason? This framework highlights the only justi-
fication for admitting sexual history evidence to show consent (i.e., its
probative value with regard to whether the woman actually consented
to the alleged rape). 1 87
What we know about sexuality'8 8 suggests, as a descriptive mat-
ter,189 that consent is contingent-meaning that consent on one occa-
sion is not probative of consent on another. Though this does not
mean that a court should never admit a woman's sexual past at
trial, 190 it does indicate the need for a dramatic analytic shift in the
treatment of sexual history evidence. Before explaining this ap-
proach,1 9 ' I first elaborate on the idea of contingent consent by offer-
ing a taxonomic description of sexual variability.
A. A Taxonomy of Sexual Variability
Along multiple dimensions, 192 women and men confront vari-
ables potentially relevant to a willingness to engage in sexual con-
duct. 193 As a starting point for discussion, I identify these overlapping
185 This assessment would find considerable support in the many ways that rape law
has been used over time to constrain women's sexual autonomy. See Roberts, supra note 5,
at 368-88.
186 See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
187 The question might be more precisely framed as follows: Does sexual consent on
past occasions where rape was not alleged bear on subsequent consent where rape was
alleged? But since this inquiry substantially departs from existing evidentiary approaches, I
do not pursue it here.
188 1 do not rule out the possibility that this knowledge will evolve, though the adapta-
tion of future social science research to the criminal justice setting is a separate question.
189 For the normative argument, see Anderson, supra note 10, at 924-27.
190 See infta Part IV.B.
191 See id.
192 The suggested taxonomy encapsulates a more nuanced way of thinking about pat-
terns. It does not purport to capture the full range of human sexuality or to provide an
explanatory model of sexual behavior. Efforts in this direction may well be doomed to fail.
193 Recent empirical work on women's sexual experiences suggests even more compli-
cated realities than are generally perceived. For instance, researchers have suggested the
need to disentangle the concepts of sexual wanting and sexual consent. See ZoE D. Peter-
son & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, Conceptualizing the "Wantedness" of Women's Consensual and
Nonconsensual Sexual Experiences: Implications for How Women Label Their Experiences with Rape,
44J. SEx REs. 72, 73-74 (2007). Subjects' reasons for wanting and reasons for not wanting
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and possibly underinclusive realms: spatial, temporal, behavioral, 19 4
and-what for many may be the most influential factor-the partner
personal.1 95 In the course of describing these realms, I observe that
each has been inadequately accounted for within the law. And yet,
the collective existence of these realms-and the fact that women af-
ford varying degrees of significance to each-hinders the possibility of
forecasting consent. This dynamic is exacerbated by the prospect of
intersectional effects between apparently separate domains.
1. Spatial
The spatial realm implicates the choice of where to participate in
sexual activities. There are countless ways of geographically dividing
the world of sex, which reaches far beyond the marriage bed. In the
rape shield context, 196 however, this world tends to be simplistically
divided into public and private space. 197 Conduct deemed public has
been assumed to bear on the likelihood of further consensual activi-
ties of a putatively nonprivate nature. 198
Judges do not always observe the spatial components of their
analysis. For instance, in a case involving the rape of a high school girl
by three fellow students in a park, the court affirmed the inadmissibil-
ity of evidence of the victim's "earlier consensual sexual intercourse
with another student in an alley behind a movie theater," but only
because there was "no showing of the appellants' knowledge of that
promiscuous behavior." 199 The court did not draw an explicit connec-
sex illustrate the complexities involved in women's sexual decision making. See id. at 78.
The data suggests the coexistence of reason and desire in influencing consent, and raises
interesting possibilities for further research that can inform the law of rape.
194 Here I do not differentiate between behaviors that take place before the sexual act
and those intrinsic to the act itself. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
195 The partner-personal category includes all considerations related to the sexual
partner's identity. See infta notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
196 Even outside this context, sexual conduct in the public domain is of concern. Con-
sider Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and striking down a statute criminalizing "deviate sexual intercourse," the U.S.
Supreme Court described the case as "involv[ing] liberty of the person both in its spatial
and in its more transcendent dimensions." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63. This transcen-
dence was qualified, however: the Court expressly noted that the case did "not involve
public conduct." Id. at 578. For a critique of the Court's Lawrence decision and its perpetu-
ation of gendered sexual roles, see Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 74, at 825-42.
197 See, e.g., State v. Shoffner, 302 S.E.2d 830, 832-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("The evi-
dence excluded suggests that the prosecuting witness's modus operandi was to accost men at
clubs, parties (public places) and make sexual advances by putting her hands 'all over their
bodies.'"); supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Sheard, 870
S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1994)).
198 But see People v. Wilhelm, 476 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding
exclusion of evidence that victim exposed her breasts to two male bar companions, stating,
"we fail to see how a woman's consensual sexual conduct with another in public indicates
to third parties that the woman would engage in similar behavior with them").
199 In the Interest of J.F.F., 341 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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tion between the location of the prior conduct and its designation as
promiscuous.
At other times, the reliance on the public/private distinction is
made explicit. In one such case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
perJustice Souter, reversed the conviction of a defendant on the basis
that he was entitled to introduce evidence that the victim had "di-
rected sexually provocative attention toward several men" in a bar
before eventually leaving for the defendant's trailer, where the two
engaged in intercourse.200 On the disputed issue of consent, the
court expressed the probative value of the excluded evidence as fol-
lows: "[T]he jury could have taken evidence of the complainant's
openly sexually provocative behavior toward a group of men as evi-
dence of her probable attitude toward an individual within the
group. ' 20 1 The public nature of the bar was critical to the analysis:
As soon as we address this process of assigning relative weight
to prejudicial and probative force, it becomes apparent that the
public character of the complainant's behavior is signifi-
cant .... [E]vidence of public displays of general interest in sexual
activity can be taken to indicate a contemporaneous receptiveness
to sexual advances that cannot be inferred from evidence of private
behavior with chosen sex partners. 20 2
Notwithstanding ajudicial focus on space that is insufficiently pri-
vate, whether and, if so, how spatial geographic concerns impact wo-
men's sexual choices remains unknown.
2. Temporal
A woman may consent to sexual conduct at different times (per
the clock or calendar, or even in relation to particular events) on dif-
ferent days. Conversely, she may choose only to engage in sex at a
given time. Rarely does the question of timing explicitly appear in
discussions of sexual patterns.20 3
3. Behavioral
Falling along this axis are pre-sex act behaviors20 4 as well those
behaviors intrinsic to the act, including type of intercourse and num-
200 State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1212 (N.H. 1988).
201 Id. at 1217 (emphasis added).
202 Id. at 1216.
203 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing Vivian Berger's hypothetical
involving Saturday nights); cf. Colbath, 540 A.2d at 1216 (relating a woman's "contempora-
neous receptiveness to sexual advances"). But see State v. Pancoast, 596 So. 2d 162, 163
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (noting relevance of "the time of day of the
encounters").
204 See, e.g., State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 520 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) ("For instance,
if a complaining witness frequently engages in sexual intercourse with men shortly after
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ber of partners (which we have already seen, tend to preoccupy the
judiciary).205 None of this, as far as we know, has probative value with-
out regard to the other domains, particularly the partner personal. 20 6
Yet a notable asymmetry undermines the law's treatment of sex-
ual behaviors. Engaging in anal sex is thought to suggest a propensity
for the same; engaging in vaginal intercourse does not. Participation
in three-way sex is deemed probative of future three-way sex; the same
is not true of sex with a single partner.
We see similar tensions in the question of whether sexual activ-
ity-of any kind, with any partner-bears on further sexual activity-
of any kind, with any partner. The core rape shield rule roundly and
rightly affirms the notion that, as a general proposition, consent to
intercourse is incident bound.20 7 A willingness to engage in sexual
activities does not imply consent in perpetuity. Accordingly, a woman
cannot be cross-examined on her nonvirginal status to show con-
sent;20 8 here, the law's directive is clear.
But courts have struggled with a converse inquiry, which asks
whether virginity is probative of nonconsent.20 9 Put differently, are
there shared characteristics of a nonsexual existence 210 that mark it as
distinctive? The issue typically arises when the state seeks to introduce
evidence of a rape victim's virginity to show the greater unlikelihood
that she would have consented to intercourse with the defendant.
With little discussion, appellate courts have at times found error in the
admission of this type of evidence, 211 and in other cases affirmed it.212
meeting them in bars, this would have some relevancy if the defendant claims she con-
sented to sexual intercourse with him under similar circumstances.").
205 See, e.g., supra notes 163-82 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
207 See FED. R. EVI. 412.
208 See id. But see supra note 11 (noting FED. R. Evio. 412's exception for evidence of
prior sexual conduct offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence).
209 See People v. Vargas, No. H020097, 2002 WL 244982, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20,
2002) ("Given the lack of evidence of virginity, the introduction of evidence thatJane was
not a virgin could have led the jury to infer a likelihood that she did give consent. We
note, however, that the notion that an 'unchaste' woman is more likely to consent than her
virtuous counterpart is 'archaic and discredited.'").
210 For present purposes, this formulation does not encompass solo activities.
211 See, e.g., People v. Bone, 584 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (precluding
"evidence of a victim's virginity as circumstantial proof of the victim's current unwilling-
ness to consent to a particular sexual act" (footnotes omitted)); cf Commonwealth v. Fran-
cis, No. 99-P-1256, 2001 WL 958756, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 22, 2001) ("Assuming
without deciding that [the victim] should not have been allowed to state that she was a
virgin at the time here in issue . . ").
212 See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 230 P.2d 216, 219 (Ariz. 1951) (evidence of prior virginity
made it highly unlikely that victim had consented to intercourse with a stranger in a pre-
rape shield case); State v. Preston, 427 A.2d 32, 33-34 (N.H. 1981) (per curiam) (rape
shield rule does not prohibit introduction of evidence of victim's virginity to show noncon-
sent to alleged rape); cf People v. Prentiss, 172 P.3d 917, 923 (Colo. App. 2006) (rape
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That courts reach opposite conclusions in the face of functionally
similar facts is hardly news. What is striking here, however, is the fail-
ure to squarely confront whether there is a meaningful distinction be-
tween entering the realm of the sexual and not entering this realm at
all. 21
3
4. Partner Personal
Last, and often most importantly, is the realm of partner charac-
teristics, which I take to include the full spectrum of individual traits.
Over time, a woman's sexual partners might share any number of at-
tributes related to personality, interests, vocation, religion, age, race,
class, ethnicity, culture, appearance, educational background, marital
status (including in relation to the woman), gender,214 sexual identity,
and surely others. Courts rarely mention these similarities.2 15 Even
on those rare occasions where they do, 216 left unsaid is why these simi-
larities are or are not significant.
The recognition that sexual consent depends on partner selec-
tion may help to explain the admissibility of prior consensual acts with
the defendant. 21 7 Now the rule of exclusion is inverted to dictate the
following proposition: though a woman's consensual conduct with A
does not bear on her willingness to engage in sex with B, it is highly
probative of subsequent consent to sex with A.
But this construction is not inevitable, and need not flow from
the precept that sexual consent is partner specific. Canadian law actu-
ally codifies the very opposite supposition (i.e., consensual sex with A
shield rule does not preclude inquiry into prior sexual history of thirteen-year-old victim
with hymenal injury).
213 The most explicit mention of this issue may be found in a 1973 case, where the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found a "rational basis for distinguishing between
admitting evidence that the victim was a virgin and excluding evidence of specific prior
events of intercourse in which the victim participated." Commonwealth v. McKay, 294
N.E.2d 213, 218 (Mass. 1973). While noting the time and distraction involved in proving
prior intercourse, the court noted without elaborating on the relative proof value of the
two categories of evidence:
The victim's lack of virginity . . . has little probative value on the issue of
consent because the victim's consent to intercourse with one man does not
imply her consent in the case of another. On the other hand, the status of
the victim as a virgin at the time of the alleged crime has far more probative
value on the issue of consent.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
214 See Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's Gay'": The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orienta-
tion, 37 GA. L. REv. 793, 824-25 (2003) (discussing cases involving evidence that the victim
was a lesbian where such evidence was offered by the prosecution to rebut a consent
defense).
215 But see supra note 28 and accompanying text (raising victim's predilection for foot-
ball players, Hardy v. State, 285 S.E.2d 547, 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)).
216 See United States v. Kelly, 33, M.J. 878, 882 (A.C.M.R. 1991); supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
217 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (citing FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B)).
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is not evidence of consent with A under differing circumstances). 21s
Perhaps we too should be less sanguine about assuming this type of
sexual path dependence. 219
Putting this suggestion to the side, notice that despite the basic
insight of rape shield law, the identity of one's sexual partner is not
always respected as paramount. Rather, at times, particular sexual be-
haviors are afforded a greater descriptive power. On these occasions, a
woman's conduct becomes the thread that weaves together a per-
ceived pattern; her partner's identity is less important than what she is
doing with whomever he might be. This discrepancy demands a ratio-
nale-one that has not been articulated. In the face of this void, we
ought to be wary of legal judgments about female sexuality.
B. An Instrumental Approach to Sexual History Evidence
Imagine a sexual encounter that shares particular characteristics
with another. Now ponder how you conjured up this constellation of
traits, and decide whether it is purely descriptive or whether it tends
to foretell consent on a later occasion, at a different time, with a dif-
ferent person. What informs your reasoning?
As we have seen, the rape shield law does not undertake this in-
quiry. Rather, it proceeds from the premise that, given the facts de-
scribed above, a woman's consent to engage in sex is more likely than
would otherwise be the case; not always, but provided the conduct at
issue is viewed as sharing the common traits of past behaviors. But
support for this supposition is hard to come by. Why women consent
218 In Canada, evidence of a woman's prior consensual conduct with an accused is "not
admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the
complainant (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the sub-
ject-matter of the charge; or (b) is less worthy of belief." Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, s. 276. For a thorough discussion of Canada's approach, see generally Susan
M. Chapman, Section 276 of the Criminal Code and the Admissibility of "Sexual Activity" Evidence,
25 QUEEN'S L.J. 121, 124-27 (1999) (exploring Canada's approach to sexual activity evi-
dence). See also People v. Buchanan, No. 258575, 2006 WL 1115968, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 2006) (affirming exclusion of evidence of wife's "propensity to engage in 'rough'
consensual sex" with her husband); Hart Schwartz, Sex with the Accused on other Occasions:
The Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection, 31 CRIM. REPs. 232, 234 (1994) ("[P]ersons involved
in an ongoing relationship do not, by that fact alone, provide some kind of tacit, or in-
ferred, consent that they are willing to engage in sexual activity. 'Actual consent' is a deci-
sion made by each of the parties at the particular time and in the particular circumstances
in question.").
219 To be clear, evidence of prior consensual sex with the defendant does not preclude
a finding of later nonconsent. But while the rape shield exception is formally compatible
with still recent recognition that marital rape is a crime, evidence law may well reflect
vestiges of the ideology that sanctioned rape within marriage. See generally Hasday, supra
note 169, at 1486-91 (exploring modern defense of marital rape exception).
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to sex under some circumstances but not others is not known-even,
or perhaps especially, by judges. 220
A theory of probative value might be grounded in an understand-
ing of sexual behavior as bypassing the reasoning process altogether.
From this perspective, consent is given in unthinking fashion. 22' Fe-
male sexual desire is the antithesis of rationality, and the female body
is merely subject to lust.222 But this vision fails for a number of rea-
sons that should by now be evident.223 First, it does not readily lend
itself to the line drawing required to distinguish between inadmissible
sexual history evidence (the rule) and admissible sexual history evi-
dence (the exception). Second, it is at odds with the requirement of
willed consent that lies at the heart of rape law. Lastly, it does not
comport with what we know about human sexual behavior.224
The alternate theory of sexual consent that I advance rests on its
contingency. A contingent view of consent is contextual, defining a
willingness to engage in sexual activities as circumscribed by the par-
ticularities of the moment. This is the conception embraced, albeit
sporadically, by the law of rape. Moreover, reflecting the multiplicity
of dimensions along which sexual encounters vary, the account is epis-
temologically sound.
If indeed consent is contingent, it gives the lie to claims that a
woman's willingness to engage in sexual acts on one occasion makes
her more likely to consent under different circumstances. This con-
tingent view of consent, which is essentially codified by the rape shield
rule, is inconsistent with an exception for particular sexual histories.
A qualified rape shield rule sees sexual consent as context dependent,
except when context disappears from judicial view. Even in the ab-
stract, faulty application aside, the sexual pattern exception fails the
test of reason.
To reject the proposition that sexual history is probative of con-
sent is not to say that a defendant's right to present a meaningful de-
220 l presume that judges have no special insights about sex that enable them to reach
sound conclusions by virtue of their judicial status. See source cited supra note 69.
221 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the legal treatment of
habit evidence).
222 See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text (discussing Chew v. State, 804
S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc)); see also Roberts, supra note 5, at 365 ("[M]yths
of the licentious Black woman and brutish Black man were deliberately perpetuated after
slavery ended and persist in contemporary American culture.").
223 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text (rejecting analogies to habit and mo-
dus operandi).
224 See supra notes 57, 123 and accompanying text; supra notes 192-95 and accompany-
ing text (noting that consent to engage in sexual behavior is both distinctly volitional and
partner specific).
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fense225 never requires the admission of sexual history evidence. As a
matter of fairness to the defendant, there may indeed be times when a
court should allow this evidence. But, unlike the law's treatment to
date, a consent defense does not itself trigger this need. Put differ-
ently, one cannot justify a rule that makes an ex ante determination in
favor of admissibility (i.e., patterned sexual history evidence becomes
admissible when a defendant raises a consent defense).
The proper default, in a rape prosecution in which consent is
disputed, is that a victim's sexual history is inadmissible. 22 6 A court
should only admit this evidence if the prosecutor's case-in-chief has
somehow enhanced its probative value, infusing it with significance
beyond the prohibited inference that consent begets consent.
This alternative approach to admissibility is instrumental, mean-
ing that it takes account of the prosecutor's theory of guilt.2 2 7 In
other words, a court should only allow sexual history evidence when
the prosecutor's case-in-chief has opened the door to its use.228 To be
clear, the door does not open simply because a defendant claims that
the victim consented, as the status quo permits. Instead, the trial
225 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing constitutional grounding for
this right).
226 The rules of evidence generally require judges to balance the probative value of
evidence against the danger that the evidence will confuse the jury or unfairly prejudice
the jury by its admission. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. This may result in the exclusion of
evidence that satisfies the minimal test of relevancy. But unless the excluded evidence is
"critical," its exclusion does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. See Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973); see also Ex parte Dennis, 730 So. 2d 138, 140-41
(Ala. 1999) (collecting cases affirming the exclusion of evidence).
227 Technical implementation of this approach would depend on the current formula-
tion of rape shield law in the particularjurisdiction. See supra notes 32-34 and accompany-
ing text (providing overview of various rape shield law regimes). In some jurisdictions, this
effort would require statutory elimination of the existing exception for pattern evidence.
In other jurisdictions, like the federal courts, statutory amendment might codify the follow-
ing proposition:
Sexual behavior with persons other than the accused is not admissible to
prove consent, regardless of perceived similarity to the charged offense. It
may only be offered to rebut evidence or argument tending to deny the
occurrence of other sexual behavior.
While legislative change of this sort cannot dictate the constitutional analysis, it can
substantially frame it. Of course, judges are the final arbiters of the question.
228 "Door opening" is a familiar evidentiary concept:
In essence, parties may lose the right to exclude evidence by their "affirma-
tive strategies."... [Door-opening] involves the use of "counterproof" and
encompasses both situations in which the invited evidence is admissible
(e.g., character of the defendant) and inadmissible (no objection was
raised to the initial evidence). Door-opening, then, strongly smacks of a
"tit-for-tat rule" that is fully justified by the adversarial ethos: "[t]he real
concern . . .is that evidence that might affect outcome should not be im-
mune from rebuttal."
Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Adversary Tria4 19 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,
22-23 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPAT-
RICK, EVIDENCE § 1.4, at 11-12 (3d ed. 2003)).
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court must assess the evidential worth of the victim's prior sexual con-
duct solely in relation to the state's theory of guilt.229 In short, the
probative value of a woman's sexual history must be evaluated-as
with any other evidence-with regard to the entire evidentiary
record.23 0
The approach that I advocate acknowledges that the prosecu-
tion's presentation of particular arguments and testimony may, under
rare instances, 23 1 create the conditions under which it would be unfair
to exclude sexual history evidence. It allows defendants to offer this
evidence when it is directly responsive to specific testimony or com-
ment. But it does not allow the inference that prior consent predicts
later consent. In short, the proposed approach maintains fidelity to
the core prohibition of rape shield law.
For a few illustrations of the circumstances I have in mind: If a
prosecutor argues that the jury should infer nonconsent from what is
referred to as the "bizarre" nature of the sexual conduct at issue, a
judge might allow evidence that the victim previously engaged in this
type of conduct. If a victim testifies that she would never willingly
participate in a particular sexual behavior, a judge might allow evi-
dence of such prior consensual activities.
These rulings would fully accord with the accepted judicial prac-
tice of allowing a defendant to introduce evidence of a woman's prior
sexual conduct only if she has testified to her virginal status. 232 Ab-
sent this testimony, such evidence is prohibited-and it is not persua-
sive for a defendant to argue that his consent defense makes it
otherwise. But if the prosecution's proof alters the evidentiary signifi-
cance of the victim's prior sexual history, the categorical rule of exclu-
sion is suspended, and a fact-specific ruling demanded. This practice
229 See Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93
MICH. L. REv. 439, 440 (1994) ("[A] determination of the conditional probative value of a
given piece of evidence is much like the ordinary determination of probative value-ex-
cept that the determination must be made twice, once with a prescribed evidentiary condi-
tion satisfied and once without.").
230 1 recognize that this solution leaves room for the continuing influence ofjudicial-
deviancy conceptions. Although the proposal does not definitively resolve the problems I
identity-as would an absolute rule of exclusion-it does place meaningful limits on any
role for normative assessments of female sexuality.
231 In most cases, the victim's prior sexual history and arguments that imply or derive
from it are not particularly probative of a fact in dispute. It may also be true that never
having engaged in a particular sexual activity with a specific individual is more suggestive
of nonconsent to that activity with the individual than is the converse.
232 See, e.g., In re K.W., 666 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (rape shield law does
not prohibit the admission of prior sexual conduct to impeach a victim's testimony that she
was a virgin prior to rape); cf People v. Vargas, No. H020097, 2002 WL 244982, at *8 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002) (rejecting a defendant's claim that the trial court erred in exclud-
ing evidence that the victim was not a virgin "[g]iven the lack of evidence of virginity," and
noting that "[d]efendant does not explain, and we cannot conceive, how the evidence
would do so except by supporting the impermissible inference").
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is the appropriate response to sexual history evidence, whether or not
it is called patterned.
Courts should treat sexual history evidence consistently, by limit-
ing its admissibility to a rebuttal function.233 Constraining the use of
prior sexual conduct in this manner rationalizes the rape shield, re-
orienting the law to a vision of consent unmediated by juridical con-
ceptions of proper female sexuality, and untarnished by an insistence
that this boundary must exist.234
CONCLUSION
As rape shield law entered its second decade, Professor Harriet
Galvin proposed amending the rules to absolutely prohibit the "invidi-
ous unchaste-character inference. '" 235 Twenty-five years after this sem-
inal treatment of the subject, sexual history exceptions endure as a
relic of the very same inference that Galvin sought to eliminate.
Cloaked in the legitimizing rhetoric of patterns, the exception allows
precisely what the rape shield purports to reject.236 All the while, the
law of patterns continues to inscribe a constricted view of female
sexuality.
2 3 7
233 The meaning of "rebuttal" that I am intending here has been described as follows:
"[T]he defendant's evidence in opposition very frequently also rebuts (i.e. tends to ex-
plain, repel, counteract, or disprove) the evidence offered by the prosecution." Michael H.
Graham, Error on Appeal: Wavier of Right, Invited Error, Rebuttal, and "Door Opening, "41 CrIM.
L. BULL. 641, 644 (2005).
234 See supra text accompanying note 114 (observing that "the idea of sexual outland-
ishness remains").
235 Galvin, supra note 3, at 809.
236 One may situate this observation within a larger feminist critique of rape law. As
Susan Estrich writes:
Sexism in the law of rape is no matter of mere historical interest; it endures,
even where some of the most blatant testaments to that sexism have disap-
peared. Corroboration requirements unique to rape may have been re-
pealed, but they continue to be enforced as a matter of practice in many
jurisdictions. The victim of rape may not be required to resist to the utmost
as a matter of statutory law in any jurisdiction, but the definitions accorded
to force and consent may render "reasonable" resistance both a practical
and a legal necessity. In the law of rape, supposedly dead horses continue
to run.
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986); see also Nourse, supra note 10, at
961-70 (discussing how, while courts have overturned laws exempting spousal rape, "the
ideas that shape the marital exemption have not died").
237 Laura Rosenbury andJennifer Rothman have persuasively argued that "legal schol-
ars should care about challenging the current construction of sex, both within the law and
outside of it." Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 74, at 813. As Rosenbury and Rothman
observe:
[T]he construction, and laws that contribute to it, benefit some individuals
while harming others, thus conflicting with norms of equality and individ-
ual liberty. The vision of acceptable sexual activity furthered by the current
construction of sex is primarily modeled on heterosexual, monogamous
couples, thus channeling sex into a domesticated and gendered form. Indi-
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The dominant rape trial paradigm is now acquaintance rape, 2 8
elevating the theoretical and doctrinal prominence of consent, 2
39
along with the evidence that attends its proof. For this next era of
rape prosecution, a framework for deciding the admissibility of sexual
history evidence must contemplate the full spectrum of female sexual
practices240 just as it affirms the contingency of consent.241
I argue that sexual history evidence 242 is not generally probative
of consent. This is true regardless of the normative judgment that
attends the behavior in question. It holds true whether the conduct is
considered mainstream or outlandish, common or unusual, quotidian
or kinky, normal or deviant. The proposed approach to admitting
history evidence incorporates these insights.
Here, negative and positive sexual freedoms converge: 243 the law
protects women's freedom from sexual violation, just as it protects the
freedom to engage in all manner of consensual sexual practices. Af-
firming the contingency of consent allows for better views of its pres-
ence, its absence, and its ambiguities.244 We become more able to
distinguish sex that is blameworthy from sex that is not.
viduals who do not adhere to this vision are stigmatized as being hypersex-
ual, asexual, criminal, or otherwise deviant.
Id. (footnote omitted).
238 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
239 The centrality of consent to the law of rape has been subject to legitimate critique.
See Chamallas, supra note 18, at 797-800; see also Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1401, 1414-21 (2005) (arguing that, in light of the shortcomings of the con-
sent requirement, it should be replaced with a negotiation requirement). For a recent
defense of the position that consent should continue to mark the boundary between crimi-
nal and noncriminal sex, see West, supra note 67, at 221-50.
240 See Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARv. J.L. & GEN-
DER 277, 280, 282 (2008) (describing the "newer generation" of sex-positive feminism as
advancing the insight that, "while sex might in some cases be a source of danger for wo-
men, it is also a potentially important site of pleasure, fulfillment, and even power"); Kath-
erine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. Rv.
181, 199-200, 202 (2001).
241 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
242 Again, the sexual pattern exception is separate from the law's treatment of prior
sex between the victim and the defendant. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text
(noting the distinction). Though this Article focuses on the former, many of its claims
have relevance to the latter exception as well. See supra note 218 and accompanying text
(describing Canadian rape shield law, which excludes this type of evidence). Further anal-
ysis of this question is beyond the scope of this work, though it is due.
243 See Franke, supra note 240, at 182 ("Curiously, since the end of the so-called 'sex
wars' in the 1980s, it seems that legal feminists have ceded to queer theorists the job of
imagining the female hody [sic] as a site of pleasure, intimacy, and erotic possibility. While
we devote our considerable energies to addressing sexuality understood in terms of free-
dom from oppressive practices, feminists in other disciplines continue to simultaneously
approach questions of sexuality in both negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom
to) terms.").
244 See West, supra note 67, at 246 ("Consent may well be a good marker for the divide
between the criminal and noncriminal in sex as elsewhere; I believe it is. It's not a good
proxy for well-being. We should not treat it as such.").
1504
